Wednesday, February 3, 2010

Two Things About the Pataki Administration and a Hope About What Is Secretly Going on Behind the Scenes Respecting Atlantic Yards

When my friends criticize the Pataki administration, as many, being Democrats, are wont to do, I, who worked for the Republican Pataki administration for all its twelve years (a substantial fraction of my overall tenure in government), think of two things about that administration, one good, one bad. I myself am almost certainly much more of a Democrat in temperament than a Republican, though if the Republicans could live up to many of what should be their aspirations I would find myself sympathetic to them. Plus the countless failures of the Democrats to live up to what should be their own aspirations frequently leave me aghast and disappointed.

The bad thing I think about with respect to the Pataki administration is one that I know comes to mind for many people think when they remember the Pataki administration. I don’t know if it is number one on the people’s list of negatives when they think of that administration but it might potentially be. It is the role the administration played in launching the execrable idea of the Atlantic Yards megadevelopment in Brooklyn. The good thing I think about is something little known and largely uncredited to the administration, something that also gives me hope for an outcome with respect to Atlantic Yards that could, unbeknownst to nearly all, be secretly in the works. The good thing I think about is the administration’s decision to send a Republican State Senator to jail.

How do I know about the Pataki administration decisions that resulted in a Republican State Senator going to jail? As the second in command of the legal department of the state finance authorities where I worked I participated in the investigation that resulted in that outcome, including bringing certain facts to light.

Pataki Support of Investigation

I should be careful not to make this sound too simple. The people at the top of the Pataki administration didn’t decide to send a powerful Republican State Senator to jail; they decided in favor of supporting the investigations that sent the Senator to jail and they didn’t decide this out of the blue. To be frank, the administration needed to be pushed a little, which is to say they needed to know the facts they were dealing with, why it was the right choice, and why perhaps there really was no other acceptable choice but to cooperatively assist in the investigation. The Senator who went to jail in the end was Guy Velella from the Bronx.

Those at the top of the Pataki administration made the right choice but the pushing and the framing of the issues that brought about the right result came from below. There is a reason that what happened with respect to the Pataki administration sending Senator Velella to jail gives me hope with respect to what may be happening regarding Atlantic Yards. It relates to the same reason that the Pataki Administration is largely uncredited for its work in sending Senator Velella to jail: That work was a long and laborious process that went on in secret for years before the outcome was revealed. Much of what happened was so secret that, for instance, only when most of this time had passed was it revealed to some top political appointees and decision makers that their own phones had been tapped.

Whistleblowers

I should point out that one thing that was key to the investigation gaining momentum was that there were whistleblowers involved, public employees who came forward with critical information about what needed to be investigated. I point this out not only because it is important to the process but also because in terms of speculating about what might be happening behind the scenes as regards Atlantic Yards it is fascinating to note that the Empire State Development Corporation, the state agency theoretically most responsible for Atlantic Yards, does not have whistleblower protection policy even though it was legally required to have adopted one by the Public Authorities Accountability Act of 2005, the provisions of which were signed into law on January 13, 2006.

The fact that ESDC doesn’t have a whistleblower protection policy doesn’t mean that ESDC doesn’t have whistleblowers and as those whistleblowers would quickly find out if they went to a lawyer it doesn’t mean that they aren’t protected if they blow the whistle on ESDC’s bad practices. Further irrespective of what management has failed to advise them of, ESDC employees should also know that they are likely to be much more protected if they blow the whistle than if they do not. What does ESDC’s failure to follow the law by not having a whistleblower policy in place that it circulates to its employees mean? One thing it means is that in ESDC’s governmental culture a focus on other things takes precedence over these kinds of good governance measures. Does it also reflect a reluctance on the part of ESDC management to curtail internal misconduct including (as required by law) by encouraging that it be reported?

As a practical matter ESDC’s failure to provide and promulgate the required policy makes it more probable that ESDC whistblowers will report ESDC misconduct to outside agencies rather than internally and it also makes it less likely that officials higher up in the ESDC organization will wind up coordinating or cooperating in investigations that ensue or even know about them.

The Investigation That Could Be Going On

What activities of ESDC with respect to Atlantic Yards might be getting investigated right now? An intriguing hint might be seen with respect to the indictment of government officials in Yonkers which very importantly relates to a Forest City Ratner project. (Forest City Ratner is, of course, the developer of Atlantic Yards.) The indictments were with respect to an illegal scheme whereby Forest City Ratner paid public officials in Yonkers for a vote in the Yonkers City Council approving their project. (See: Thursday, January 7, 2010, Got “Bilked?” The New York Times Biased Report on Federal Investigation Involving Forest City Ratner.) Forest City Ratner has not been indicted yet with respect to those events nor have any of its “employees” but as part of the scheme Forest City Ratner did agree to engage as a “consultant” one of the indicted public officials even though it is clear that they certainly knew of the indicted official’s illegal conduct since the furnishing of that consultancy position was itself part of the indicted conduct. For more on how the fact pattern in Yonkers comports with the probabilities of a future indictment of Forest City Ratner see the post we linked to above.

Velella Investigation and Indictment

Senator Velella (and two others, his father and also an official from the housing agencies for whom I worked) eventually went to jail for patterns of illegal conduct that were quite similar to what happened in the Yonkers indictment situation. Guy Velella was indicted in 2002 on 25 counts of bribery and conspiracy for allegedly accepting at least $137,000 in exchange for steering public development contracts to parties from whom he was receiving payments. The charges involved illegal solicitations for far greater sums, “more than $250,000.” See the District Attorney’s May 9. 2002 Press Release and the Times article: State Senator Quits in Deal Over a Bribery Indictment, by James C. Mckinley Jr., May 15, 2004. (Years before in 1993, Velella was accused of fixing local school board elections though no charges were filed.)

The charges ranged from steering subsidized housing projects to developers to fixing the bid process so that contractors would get bridge painting contracts by paying to have their award politically influenced. One such bridge painting contract fix involved a contractor who had submitted a $37.7 million dollar bid to paint the Verrazano Narrows Bridge. That bid was actually supposed to be the low bid for the Verrazano but, at least with respect to another bridge painting contract also being “fixed” (the Dunn Memorial Bridge) there were concerns about whether the contractor was a "responsible" bidder because of past safety violations.

Shades of Velella

When looking at both the Yonkers indictments and the facts that emerged respecting events that sent Senator Velella and his cohorts to jail one has to wonder how distinguishable or different are the fact pattens and conduct of government officials with respect to Atlantic Yards, not to mention some of the overlapping patterns associated with the Columbia University expansion eminent domain case. Atlantic Yards (similarly the Columbia case) involves political manipulations to confer a massive mega-monopoly and an astounding heap of subsidies on a developer without any real, true or credible bid, and without any accompanying cost benefit analysis despite neutral and convincing analysis that the only actions now being taken ESDC and the city will result in net losses to the public.

Things Seen First Hand or Not Seen at All

I learned from the Velella investigation things that, until you have seen them first hand, may seem difficult to appreciate. One is how the smell of something wrong can, with due investigation, can escalate from a few facts and leads to a treasure chest of documenting evidence. (Velella and his cohorts pled guilty rather than stand trial. Velella also surrendered his law license.) Another is how investigations take on a life of their own when investigators know they are on to something. It probably helps when there are multiple investigators (or the possibility of them) following up on a scent because then none of them want to risk being considered lax in their follow-up either for a perceived lack of investigative skill or deference to the investigated. I learned that while people will tell you things that give you a clear general idea of what is going on (thus encouraging the investigators to steadfastly persevere) there may be delay and lull as those same people express reluctance to testify or provide more essential details. I learned that as much as you may think you know, it may still be only the tip of the iceberg. I also learned that late in the game additional information can flood in the most unexpectedly strange ways surprising those who are suddenly its recipients.

One thing of particular importance that I learned is that sometimes when bad things are happening that officials in power actually know about and want to stop, bad things those officials actually have the ability and probably duty under most conditions to stop, that the investigators may not want those bad activities halted. Instead the investigators may want more time to observe and collect evidence as the bad activities continue. Colloquially put, they will encourage that the perpetrators be given enough rope to hang themselves. It is not that investigators can order an agency to allow a continued breaking of the law or bad practices but you may find them strongly suggesting postponement of corrective action. It is uncomfortable but the investigators can provide some assurance that in the end when everything else comes out that they will be able to vouch that you were cooperating.

To whom might investigators be suggesting such things? Unless you are actually yourself amongst the small group of public officials to whom they are directly making such requests you are unlikely to be aware that such requests have been made or are being operatively honored. That may pose some quizzically challenging conundrums for observers trying to figure out why it seems bad actions are being tolerated. Who knows what conclusions observers will reach? I previously reported that when City Councilman Brad Lander was a candidate for the City Council office he recently won, he asserted that he “was the lone voice calling attention to corruption at the Pataki-era NYS Housing Finance Agency” (the Agency where I worked) which he said “had become a corrupt candy store.” There are many reasons a political candidate might resort to making those kinds of charges during a campaign: One of them is that from Mr. Lander's vantage he had no idea how much toil was going on internally at the agencies to foil the bad guys.

Only Those Who Need to Know

The fact is that investigations are conducted on a need to know basis. Even though some of us at the agency were close to the core of the Velella investigation and its very origin and even though we participated in and contributed to the investigation, there was much that the investigators did not tell us and that we did not know. Similarly there were other officials or public employees who also knew of some aspects of the investigation (in some cases less than we knew) but did not know how much they did not know. Some may have specifically known they didn’t know everything but still didn’t know what they didn’t know. A couple of things to note in this regard: It’s not a bad formula to encourage good behavior and secondly, since you yourself don’t know exactly where your puzzle pieces fit in when you provide them to investigators it is good to be vigilant and meticulous about the truth.

When Whistleblowers Don’t Come Forward

The willingness of whistleblowers to come forward is invaluable to maintaining a good public agency environment. While I also have praise for whistleblowers it should be noted that they need not be acting altruistically; it is also in the whistleblower’s own interest to do the right thing. Not coming forward when the opportunity presents itself, especially when one is in the higher echelons of public service, can have a price. I empathize that it can be extraordinarily difficult to come forward. There is almost always the implicit assumption to be made when one sees bad conduct high up in government that such conduct exists because it is tolerated by the `powers that be’ with the belief that it is supported as high up perhaps as a mayor or a governor.

A case in point I can offer is the scandal that occurred at the New York City Housing Development Corporation (HDC), a housing finance agency that is, coincidentally, expected to be asked to provide a vast amount of subsidized financing to the no-bid Atlantic Yards. As was ultimately disclosed and written about extensively, including in a series of scathingly detailed articles* by Tom Robbins that appeared in the Village Voice, the Executive Director of that agency was involved in considerable personal misconduct at the expense of that agency.

(* Some of those Tom Robbins articles include: The Lush Life of a Rudy Appointee: How a Politically Tied Aide Spent a Quarter of a Million Dollars on Food, Fun, and Travel, Tuesday, April 9, 2002, Harding's Conflict of Interest: After Pledging to Steer Clear of Dad's Law Firm, Son Aided a Client, Tuesday, July 9, 2002, Russell Harding's Vanity Fair: 'Voice' Trail Led to Charges, Tuesday, March 18, 2003, Harding's Hustle: Bonuses, Bargains, and Strip Clubs at the Housing Development Corporation, Tuesday, May 7, 2002, Harding's Collateral Damage: Bloomberg Drops the Hammer—Selectively, Tuesday, May 13, 2003.)

No doubt the sense of the agency employees (and potential whistleblowers) was that the conduct was tolerated by the mayor at the time, Rudolph Giuliani. The Executive Director in question, Russell Harding, was a son of Ray Harding, the head of the Liberal Party with whom Giuliani was aligned and someone whose political endorsement was politically important. For one thing, it meant having Guiliani’s name at the head of on an extra column when voters went into the voting booth.

It must have seemed to many within the agency that because of Giuliani assumed endorsement and/or tolerance of the misbehavior that there would have been great professional career risk to coming forward to report impropriety and further that there were forces at work to assure that it all would be kept from coming to light. But come to light it did. And when it came to light, those that were perceived as having tolerated (or perhaps merely failed to detect) the misbehavior suffered professionally from what they did not do instead of from what they did do. Some senior officials left the agency. Others who remained were not promoted. As onlookers we can only assume what the connections were. I know that much of the talk on the outside was that it was unfortunate that good capable public servants were hurt because they did not know what to do when those politically above them were loathsomely perceived as on the side of misconduct.

One Tom Robbins Village Voice article specifically addresses the failure of whistleblowers to come forward: Where Are the Whistle-Blowers? Why City Workers Don't Speak Out, by Tom Robbins Tuesday, July 2, 2002. According to Robbins the misconduct went unreported although:
How widely known were Harding's abuses? "Everybody knows" was the answer. "And everyone is terrified."
and
the goings-on were common knowledge
When Russell Harding pled guilty to fraud and conspiracy charges (in addition to the charges respecting child pornography on his office computer) he admitted to stealing more than $400,000 from the housing agency he once headed and agreed to serve up to 63 months in prison. Much of his stealing from the Agency was done by extravagant and ostentatious use of the agency credit cord and expense account for personal travel and dining. It was documented in excruciating detail right down to The Village Voice publishing an image of a receipt for the morning bagel Harding’s regularly had his agency pay for.

ESDC’s Failure to Adopt Required Whistleblower Policy

This brings us back to the glaring absence of the whistleblower protection policy that ESDC and its sister agencies failed to adopt as required. We must reiterate that the absence of whistleblower policy doesn’t mean that there aren’t whistleblowers at ESDC or that they aren’t entitled to protection, just that ESDC is running an operation where employees are not being informed that it is public policy to bring misconduct at the agencies to light.

Ideally, a public agency should promulgate the whistlblower protection policy it is required to have and make it a focus in a number of ways. The policy should be circulated to the employees on a regular basis. It should be furnished to all new employees so that they are aware of the policy from the very first day of their employment. The policy should be regularly reviewed by the agency’s board so that the board can make sure it is up to date, and be reminded of it importance while demonstrating to others that the policy is regarded as important enough to justify regular consideration. The policy should also be on the agency’s website so that employees can readily and unobtrusively access it (for example from home or a library) without feeling that they are calling uncomfortable attention to themselves.

I therefore expected that if ESDC had the policy it is required to I would likely find it on ESDC’s website. I hoped I would find it there even though ESDC is singularly nontransparent when it comes to the use of its website to provide information about the agency. This is appearently at least partly due to the fact that ESDC is lax about following requirements. (See: Thursday, December 17, 2009, Due diligence on the BALDC leads down a rabbit hole, while other state agencies are more transparent than ESDC/JDA/BALDC.) As for its website, it should be noted that it was just revised though again the agency apparently did not invest the kind of resources it could have in this public interface. (See: Tuesday, February 02, 2010, ESDC debuts new, more transparent web site; drops "New York Loves Business" but does claim it's "Open for Business".)

When we did not find a whistleblower policy on ESDC’s website we began to suspect what turned out to be true: ESDC and its co-located sister agencies never adopted a whistleblower protection policy. This was confirmed when contacting ESDC to obtain a copy of the required policy. We were told that “ESDC does not currently have such a policy.” I was told however that ESDC would be adopting a whistleblower policy because it was recognized that amendments to the Public Authority Accountability Act were enacted last fall which will be “effective this spring” require public authorities to have such a policy. (NOTE: I think this is a relatively significant scoop worth brandishing for other representatives of the press to pick up.)

The Law Has Required a Whistleblower Policy Since 2006

I responded by making clear that while the amendments that take effect this spring revisit the requirement of having a whistleblower policy with more extensive provisions to supervise the authorities, what I had been looking for was a policy adopted in compliance with and pursuant to the original Public Authorities Accountability Act of 2005. On its face the act’s provision applies to ESDC and we were not advised that there is any reason that ESDC believes it doesn’t.

More specifically, pursuant to that original act, signed into law on January 13, 2006 as Chapter 766 of the Laws of 2005:
§ 18. Title 2 of article 9 of the public authorities law is amended by adding a new section 2824 to read as follows:

§ 2824. Role and responsibilities of board members. 1. Board members of state and local authorities shall . . .

(e) establish written policies and procedures on personnel including policies protecting employees from retaliation for disclosing information concerning acts of wrongdoing, misconduct, malfeasance, or other inappropriate behavior by an employee or board member of the authority, investments, travel, the acquisition of real property and the disposition of real and personal property and the procurement of goods and services;
The act provided that it would take effect immediately and apply to the public authority fiscal year beginning on or after January 1, 2006. Ergo, ESDC was required to a have a whistleblower policy from 2006 on.

Promulgating the Policy

As for putting the policy on it website, the act doesn’t require that, but it does encourage other information to be on the agency’s website and other agencies have taken the hint to put their policies there.

The act does specify that the authorities' policies for the disposition of their property should be on their websites (and presumes Procurement Guidelines will be there too) and more generally provides:

To the extent practicable, each state authority shall make accessible to the public via its official internet web site documentation pertaining to its mission, current activities, most recent annual financial reports, current year budget and its most recent independent audit report unless such information is covered by subdivision two of section eighty-seven of the public officers law.

What might such a policy look like? I can point you to the policy you can find on the website for the New York State Housing Finance Agency and its sister co-located sister agencies (on a page that makes many other policies available). It is not bad policy if we don’t say so ourselves. It looks like this:

10011401HFAWhistleblowerPolicy

Toughened Whistleblower Requirements Coming in March


More whistleblower requirements that ESDC is supposed to follow are coming effective March 1, 2010 with the amendments to the Public Authorities Reform Act of 2009. These amendments to the 2005 Public Authorities Accountability Act strengthen the original whistleblower provisions by requiring a Whistleblower Access and Assistance Program in consultation with the Attorney General that (i) establishes toll-free phone lines available to employees, and (ii) offers advice and consultation on state and federal laws and further provides that an authority like ESDC may not fire, discharge, demote, suspend, threaten, harass, or discriminate against any employee for their whistleblower actions.

Don’t Assume What’s Not Happening

As I opened by saying, I think the worst thing the Pataki administration ever did was launch the atrocity known as Atlantic Yards, but the best thing I remember that it did was largely unknown: it supported the kind of investigation that could stop Atlantic Yards dead in its tracks.

I can easily imagine myself in the ESDC environment and I often see familiar faces at ESDC, people with whom I have worked. While I regularly wonder about the unjustified support for Atlantic Yards that I see coming from ESDC and other agencies, including the city agencies accountable to Bloomberg, I don’t want to be quick to judge individuals. You never know what is really going on or what you might discover their roles are if you could delve below the surface.

As you can tell from looking at the indictment of Senator Guy Velella, much can be happening for a long time before the fact that correction and redress is coming becomes apparent. The Velella indictment concerned actions that went as far back as late 1995. Velella was not publicly indicted until May 2002. Treasure troves of information that went into that indictment were found as late as the fall of 1999 but the investigation was underway for a long time before that. Still, justice takes time. The Senator didn’t plead guilty or resign his office until two years after his indictment in May of 2004.

Similarly, when Russell Harding finally pled guilty in March of 2005 (he was indicted in March 2003) it concerned misconduct that reportedly went all the way back to 1998. The Tom Robbins articles disclosing everything in detail started in April 2002.

Never Assume Information Will Stop Coming

Information never stops coming out and you never know from where. We mentioned Russell Harding, who ran the New York City Housing Development Corporation and should have had the whistle blown on him by the officials who worked under his direction. He eventually went to prison for felony (embezzlement, child porn) and came out in 2007. In August of 2008 Mr. Harding started a blog, called Rudyveritas.com. While the blog is perhaps suspect due to some obvious anger on his part, Mr. Harding started telling some convincing-sounding stories about misconduct by those high up in the Giuliani administration with whom he worked. (See: Saturday, September 27, 2008, In tale of Giuliani influence, insight into the flexibility in size of affordable housing units.)

When I see all the faces in the ESDC panoply, one thing I say to myself is that any of those people could already be whistleblowers. Some of them, unbeknownst to most of the rest of us, may even be very involved in assisting investigators to investigate the things that seem so very wrong at ESDC. And even if the individuals in question are not whistleblowers yet, they may soon be whistleblowers when ESDC finally, belatedly issues and circulates to its employees its new whistleblower policy which will apparently be at about the same time that the extra whistleblower protections kick in from the Public Authorities Reform Act of 2009.

Interplay of Whistleblowers and the Race for Attorney General

I would be remiss if I did not observe that the new law that brings the Attorney General’s office directly into the whistleblower picture could cause some synergistic dynamics to come into play. If Andrew Cuomo, the current attorney general, runs for governor as expected, the office will be taken over by a successor. We have already speculated that the race amongst the candidates to replace Mr. Cuomo as attorney general logically could turn into a race to investigate Atlantic Yards as well. That could mean a race between the candidates, and if needs be a race to show up Mr. Cuomo as well if he has not done a good job or appears to have been deterred from an active investigation by campaign contributions (read on).

Among the candidates interested in the Attorney General position is Assemblyman Richard Brodsky (as we wrote before) who made his bones as an expert on misconduct at public authorities, and with his investigations into the financing of Yankee Stadium, exactly the kind of abuse that is being ratcheted up a few levels with the financing of the Atlantic Yards basketball arena. Another interested candidate is former State Superintendent of Insurance, Eric R. Dinallo. Mr. Dinallo is not in a position to feign naivete about abusive favoritism with respect to the handing out of housing subsidies since his wife just stepped down as the head of the housing finance agencies where I used to work.

The Justice That Money Can Buy? How Atlantic Yards Is Already Before the State Attorney General’s Office

The dynamics of all this vying for position will all be complicated by political campaign contributions. Right now that can be seen most visibly with respect to Mr. Cuomo. The Times just ran an article about how “the real estate industry was the top giver to Mr. Cuomo” [the current attorney general now expected to run for governor (and someone I worked with on housing at my old agencies)] and how “over the past three years as he amassed $18 million, leaving him with a five-to-one advantage over Gov. David A. Paterson, a fellow Democrat.” (See: Real Estate Interests Help Cuomo Gain a Big Edge in Cash, by Christine Haughney, January 28, 2010.) The article says that in the last six months 17 percent of Mr. Cuomo’s money came from the real estate industry with it being 20 percent of what he has gotten from individuals.

As the Times puts it:
The money has come as Mr. Cuomo’s office has been flooded with complaints about construction in new developments, especially from buyers who are trying to break their sales contracts, claiming that builders are not living up to their promises.
And the Times also noted that “Bruce C. Ratner, the Atlantic Yards developer” was among the “prominent givers” to Mr. Cuomo, also noting that:
Many of the major developers’ projects, like the World Trade Center and Atlantic Yards, are likely to come before the next governor.
The Times reported that Mr. Cuomo purportedly has procedures to protect against conflicts of interest from those developers considered to have matters before his office:
Aides to Mr. Cuomo said he had set up a rigorous screening process that requires donors to certify that they have had no matter before his office for the past three months. They say he keeps a firewall between his campaign and the operation of his office, and goes further than any other state official in vetting contributors.
In this regard, the Times noted that three donations Mr. Cuomo had accepted from developer Shaya Boymelgreen “totaling $8,000 from Boymelgreen-related companies between Jan. 15, 2008, and May 11, 2009" would “After an inquiry from The Times” be returned by Mr. Cuomo. The Times had been able to document that “residents at the Newswalk building in Brooklyn” who were suing Boymelgreen had contacted Cuomo’s office about construction problems in 2006 and 2007 and that Mr. Cuomo’s office has taken no action.

The Times did not mention that Mr. Boymelgreen, who had given his political contributions to Cuomo “while his empire was unraveling,” was also intricately involved in Atlantic Yards related litigation where he colluded with Forest City Ratner to take property from Henry Weinstein for the project. Making Mr. Boymelgreen’s intricate relationship to the Atlantic Yards even more Byzantine, the very oddly shaped Atlantic Yards mega-project footprint wraps around the Newswalk building in a very suspicious way.

While the Times mentioned that Atlantic Yards is “likely to come before the next governor” the Times did not point out that Mr. Cuomo has already been asked as Attorney General to investigate Forest City Ratner in connection with Atlantic Yards, nor did it report that Mr. Cuomo has returned Mr. Ratner’s contributions to him. The article also passed up the opportunity to mention the Times’ own business relationship to Mr. Ratner.

Pending Requests to Attorney General Cuomo on Atlantic Yards

State Senator Bill Perkins has asked the Attorney General to issue an opinion with respect to whether the issuance of the Atlantic Yards arena bonds was legal. (See: Wednesday, December 23, 2009, Perkins to Cuomo: issue an opinion as to whether AY bond process was legal.) Perkins had already sent to Cuomo (and also State Comptroller DiNapoli) a copy of an earlier letter to the Governor raising Atlantic yards legal issues. (See: Saturday, December 19, 2009, Hail Mary or silver bullet: Perkins, raising questions of fraud in arena bond sale, asks Paterson to put Atlantic Yards on hold.) Develop Don’t Destroy Brooklyn has asked that the Attorney General Cuomo (and State Comptroller Thomas DiNapoli) investigate the issuance of the bonds. (See: Cuomo and DiNapoli Urged to Investigate Ratner's Arena Junk Yard Bonds, December 14, 2009.) Noticing New York sent its own letter similarly asking for such an investigation. (See: Sunday, December 13, 2009, To Attorney General Andrew Cuomo and State Comptroller Thomas DiNapoli: Investigate and Halt Issuance of Arena Bonds.) In addition to giving campaign contributions to Cuomo, Ratner is giving campaign contributions to DiNapoli. (See: Wednesday, January 06, 2010, Ratner, no longer a campaign contribution "refusenik," is already investing in Cuomo and DiNapoli 2010.)

All of this is to say that the issue of Atlantic Yards is clearly front and center before the Attorney General’s office. If Mr. Cuomo has not already begun an investigation of Atlantic Yards the dynamic could be very interesting when the new whistleblower-related requirement for public authorities take effect in March and are ultimately investigated (or not) by Mr. Cuomo and then by the Attorney General who is the successor to Mr. Cuomo. And who would like to guess how all this will play out? We note, by the way, that while it has been suggested that the provisions of the 2009 reform act taking place in March will not be retroactive, the effect of stronger whistleblower provisions cannot help but have a retroactive effect when bad conduct being reported has taken place in the past.

By the way, if anyone wants to suppose that Mr. Cuomo or his successor as state attorney general either aren’t currently investigating or won’t eventually investigate, I will point out that investigations don’t necessarily have to be conducted only by the state Attorney General’s Office. It was a local district attorney’s office (of which there are many with the power to act) that sent Senator Velella to jail and it was federal investigators who convicted the NYC’s Housing Development Corporation’s Russell Harding (and some others*) sending him to jail. And that’s all the more reason for Cuomo and his successor not to want to be shown up as lax in their responsibilities.

(* Former city housing commissioner Richard Roberts pled guilty to lying about receipt of a $38,000 SUV and Harding aide Luke Cusack also admitted conspiracy and theft.)

Pataki vs. Cuomo

Whether or not Mr. Cuomo ultimately investigates vigorously I remind you that Governor Pataki, who replaced Mr. Cuomo’s father as governor, did, as we noted at the outset, support the kind of investigation we are talking about.

December’s Little Birdie?

One of the last times someone solemnly asked me what I expected to happen next with respect to Atlantic Yards was on a snowy Saturday coming home from the public meeting in Harlem where State Senator Bill Perkins requested Governor David Paterson to declare a moratorium on the state’s abuse of eminent domain (followed up by a quick impromptu press conference with the Governor). ESDC was poised to assist Forest City Ratner in with the ill-advised issuance of arena bonds the developer was nevertheless desperate to see issued. (See: Saturday, December 19, 2009, Hail Mary or silver bullet: Perkins, raising questions of fraud in arena bond sale, asks Paterson to put Atlantic Yards on hold.) We said then that we really didn’t know what would happen because the wild cards were impossible to predict and we speculated that something might turn up in the way of indictments.

Oddly enough, it was just a few business days later that the indictments concerning Forest City Ratner’s Ridge Hill project in Yonkers were announced. (See: Wednesday, January 06, 2010
Forest City Ratner, unnamed/unindicted, cited as giving indicted man consulting job after he got Yonkers Council Member to change vote on Ridge Hill.)

Did I actually know something back in December or was I just a good judge about the kind of things that might be happening behind the scenes?

Wednesday, January 27, 2010

Did New York City Planning Officials Sidestep Looking at the Bigger Atlantic Yards Picture?

(Above: Our Ratner Brooklyn real estate mega-monopoly map. Atlantic Yards is in the lower right corner. How much of the future development of the contiguous Ratner-owned property with 19 new towers and an arena was reviewed by City Planning officials? That is what this post is about.)

We have been writing recently about how Atlantic Yards really ought to be viewed in terms of the bigger picture of what Forest City Ratner plans to build and own as part of the mega-monopoly rights it is being handed (without bid) for 30 contiguous acres of prime Brooklyn real estate. It plans to build 19 new towers plus an arena, not just the 16 towers plus an arena more frequently talked about. (See: Monday, January 25, 2010, How Big Is Atlantic Yards Really? 16 New Buildings or 19? (Plus the Arena plus. . ) and Thursday, January 7, 2010, An Updated Map of Forest City Ratner’s 50+ Acre Prime Brooklyn Real Estate Mega-Monopoly.)

The 19 new towers plus arena are just the new development Forest City Ratner intends to hold the rights to. When all is said an done, the Atlantic Yards mega-development site Forest City Ratner intends to own includes the following:
• Two large suburban-style shopping malls (existing)
• One sports arena (proposed)
• 20 towers of both residential and commercial development. (One built and 19 planned.)
That, together with other nearby Forest City Ratner sites like MetroTech, would give the politically-favored, publicly-subsidized real estate firm a mega-monopoly on a total of about 50 acres constituting a heavy preponderance of the most primes, densely zoned land in or near Downtown Brooklyn, property that is particularly valuable because it sits astride the key subway lines that make Brooklyn’s best land readily accessible.

Did City Planning Look at the Whole 19-Yards Towers Version of the Megadevelopment?

Given that we believe that Atlantic Yards really ought to be thought of in terms of its total 19 new towers plus an arena plan, we wondered if city planning officials had looked at the megadevelopment this way when they had the opportunity to review the megadevelopment or did they handle it in a more downplaying fashion? This is important because review by City Planning Commissioner Amanda Burden and all the city planning agency planning officials who work under her in the City Planning Department (officially said to have begun their review in 2004) was handled with a lot of kabuki theater maneuvers regarding the mega-project’s design and size. Most particularly, in late 2005, running through to a climax in late 2006 and early 2007, that kabuki theater related especially to the size of the project. (See: Monday, September 22, 2008, Should a Teardrop be Shed- Considering the Burden?)

Context: City Planning Commissioner Amanda Burden Credited With Downsizing Mega-Project that Didn’t get Downsized

In January 2007 the Times ran a fluff piece about Ms. Burden wherein she was credited with playing “a powerful behind-the-scenes role . . . in limiting the size of the Atlantic Yards development near Downtown Brooklyn.” (See: Once at Cotillions, Now Reshaping the Cityscape, By Diane Cardwell, January 15, 2007)

But that was just a story. The project was not actually made smaller. As we wrote before:
Essentially the project wound up being the same size (or slightly bigger) than it was originally proposed when introduced December 2003 as follows. Like a department or electronics store “rasing prices” so they can then advertise “lowering prices” as a phony sales pitch, the developer, Forest City Ratner, boosted the theoretical size of the mega-project in order to thereafter advertise on the front page of the Times that it had been `reduced’ (For a lot more on this see: Tuesday, December 26, 2006, The Times defends the front-page scaleback story, but then practices "rowback") Ergo, the project was not actually made smaller than the giant sponge for subsidy that the developer himself originally conceived.
City Planning Skips Review of Entire Mega-Project of 19 New Towers

Given all this focus on whether the mega-project was too large, combined with the fact that Ms. Burden and her city planning officials took credit for downsizing it when they actually didn’t, we wondered whether City Planning’s review of the mega-project looked at it in terms of its inescapably larger proposed size, 19 new towers rather than 16. We think they should have. Instead, the evidence is that City Planning again played along with the effort to depict Forest City Ratner’s overall plans as being for just 16 new towers.

Exhibit A for this conclusion is the City Planning Commission’s September 27, 2006 letter of recommendations on the project ("Commission Letter") which only deals with 16 new towers and contains no mention of the three towers Ratner plans to build atop the Atlantic Center Mall. (That letter appears below.) Not content to reach this conclusion without checking further we contacted City Planning to ask whether the Department or the Commissioner had considered plans for those three towers as part of the overall plans for the key Brooklyn site. We will let you review their response to decide for yourself, but again we think that the evidence is that neither the Commission nor the Department reviewed the developer’s overall plans and that their efforts were to downplay and view the project as a smaller project to the greatest extent possible.

Commission's September 27, 2006 Letter of Recommendations

As you will discern from the commission’s letter, the commission writes about 16 new towers and it concerned itself with design questions pertaining to some of them. It doesn’t mention or similarly deal with the other three towers.

For all the letter may say, because of the Empire State Development Corporation’s override of city zoning as well as the normally applicable ULURP planning and review procedures, the City Planning Commission’s letter officially could only be persuasive; City Planning had “no veto.” (That may not be true with respect to the additional three towers in question.) Nevertheless, the letter and kabuki theater that accompanied it can be viewed as supportive of the project.

10012703CityPlanninggpp Atlantic Yards


Noticing New York’s Questions to City Planning: Did the Commission or the Department Review or Consider the Three Towers Atop the Atlantic Center Mall That the Developer Is Including In His Plans to Build 19 New Towers?

Here is what we inquired of the City Planning press office (by phone followed up by e-mail):
Subject: Review of the Atlantic Yards Project; Developer's Three Towers Over Atlantic Center Mall

I would like to know whether, when, and to what extent the Department and the Commission reviewed and considered the planned development of Forest City Ratner's three new towers over the Atlantic Center Mall.

You previously informed me that Department staff began working and speaking with the project team about general principles related to the public realm, and reducing the size of the project in 2006. You also referred me to the Commission's September 27, 2006 letter of recommendations on the project ("Commission Letter") at the following link:

The Commission Letter states:

"The Commission is pleased that the ESDC and the developers have consulted with the Department of City Planning during the course of the design of this Project, and that this has resulted in several major improvements to the Project's urban design features and amenities."

The Commission Letter indicates that the Atlantic Yards project that the Commission reviewed entails 7.53 to 7.555 million square feet of new development (EITHER 6,790,000 square feet residential, approximately 600,000 square feet office space and a 165,000 square-foot, 180-room hotel- OR- 5,730,000 square feet residential and 1.8 million square feet of office space).

While the Atlantic Yards project is frequently described as a project of no more than 7.799 million square zoning feet (16 new towers plus a sports arena on 22 acres of land), the project has been considered as part of the developer's overall planned new development of 9.049 million square feet of contiguous commonly owned land (19 new towers plus a sports arena on approximately 30 acres of land). Original models of the overall development showed this larger configuration of 19 new towers plus the new arena. The difference between the more typically used description of the developer's planned new development and the larger configuration of new development is accounted for by three towers that will constitute 1.25 million square feet of residential and/or commercial development over the Atlantic Center Mall. Presuming that space would be residential, that would be approximately 21.8% more residential space than the "5,730,000 square feet residential" considered by the Commission as part of what the Commission Letter referred to as the "Commercial Variation" of the project.

You asked whether the three towers were addressed by documents signed by the city or the General Project Plan ("GPP"). While the three towers may not, per se, be mentioned in the GPP the GPP integrates with the development of those towers and as they are addressed by the MOU (dated February 18, 2005) signed on behalf of the city by Deputy Mayor Daniel Doctoroff concurrently with other documents intended to address the project. It was also signed by the city's EDC.

While the Commission Letter addresses itself to a number of aspects of development by the developer at the site, changes in design and reduction in size included, under various headings ("Building 1," "Building 3," "Building 6," "Site 5," "Open Space" and "Affordable Housing") the Commission Letter does not mention or address the developer's planned new development of the 1.25 million square feet of space in the three new towers over the Atlantic Center Mall.

Here is the clarifying follow-up I request from you.

1. Did the Department review and consider the developer's planned new development of the 1.25 million square feet of space in the three new towers over the Atlantic Center Mall?

2. Did the Commission do so?

3. If so, when and to what extent did each do so?

4. Were recommendations made with respect thereto?

5. If so, what were these recommendations?
City Planning’s Response

Here is the response we received form City Planning’s press representative:
In response to your questions, the scope of the City Planning Commission’s review and recommendations regarding the Atlantic Yards Project are reflected in the GPP letter, available at the link you noted in your email. As to its consideration of the context of the project, that letter notes (pg 2) “The Commission believes that the [Atlantic Yards] Project builds on the City’s ongoing efforts to continue the growth of Downtown Brooklyn, the city’s third-largest central business district, by utilizing the area’s excellent transit infrastructure to provide new entertainment, commercial and residential uses.” The Department was well aware of the further Atlantic Center development potential inasmuch as this is a longstanding City project that has gone through the City’s land use review process.

For additional information regarding the MOU you reference, your questions should be addressed to the signatories.
Obviously that response says that “The Department was well aware of the further Atlantic Center development potential inasmuch as this is a longstanding City project that has gone through the City’s land use review process.” It says they are “aware” of the potential, but where is the evidence that City Planning dealt with it in any review?

Important?

Why is it important whether the City Planning Commission or the City Planning Department dealt with the larger project as a whole rather than just participating in the manipulation of public perceptions about the project size? Because that is what city planning is supposedly about, looking at how planned city developments operate as a whole, integrating with the environment around them. The focus of City Planning officials is not supposed to be minimizing reviews and coordinating with the developers’ PR.

Tuesday, January 26, 2010

Forest City Ratner’s Two Buildings In Brooklyn Heights Need to be Condemned!

(Above: Sidewalk cracks outside Forest City Ratner's movie theater on Court Street. Why are we showing them? Read on.)

We have been writing about the prevalence of sidewalk cracks in the city. Why? Because sidewalks cracks are supposedly a characteristic of “blight” that can allow the Empire State Development Corporation (ESDC) or any other eminent domain abuse-minded agency to seize and hand over entire city blocks to politically-connected developers who want to “redevelop” those blocks (typically at a much higher density with a zoning density increase or zoning override). We last wrote (supplying documenting photographs) about how, applying this criteria, the homes and blocks where Atlantic Yards supporters Senator Charles E. Schumer and Brooklyn Borough President Marty Markowitz live need to be condemned. (See: Thursday, January 21, 2010, Senator Schumer’s Block Is (Super) “Blighted”! (And Back to You, Marty).)

Before that we wrote (again supplying pictures) about:
how ubiquitous “blight”-qualifying cracks in the sidewalk can be, how they can be found surrounding Brooklyn’s Borough Hall, anywhere in Manhattan that you might glance down, and in prestigious Brooklyn Heights, running the entire route from the premier homes on the Promenade to Borough Hall, no matter the street you pick to travel, Montague Street, Remsen Street, or whatever.
(See: Friday, January 15, 2010, Up and Down, "Blight" Is Everywhere: Just Glance Down “At Any Point” and Find “Blight” Smiling Back to You.)

Look Sharp, Brooklyn Heights. Pay Attention, Mr. Ratner.

Brooklyn Heights residents better start getting ready for a lot of demolition and zoning increases because we are ready to write about the “blighted” condition of the Heights one more time: This time we are going to write about how the blocks with the two Brooklyn Heights Forest City Ratner-owned properties need to be condemned- - Lots of sidewalk cracks there too! . . .

. . . Surprise! Forest City Ratner, the politically-connected developer that is utilizing the sidewalk crack “blight” pretext, as a eminent domain-invoking device to consolidate a mega-monopoly hold on 30 contiguous acres of prime Brooklyn real estate can be hoisted on its own petard. As soon as Forest City Ratner completes the proposed Atlantic Yards megadevelopment (if it ever does, and even then it may be forty years), the project can be seized from it because of sidewalk crack blight! (Maybe seized even sooner!) At least that’s the evidence in Brooklyn Heights.

This shouldn’t to be a surprise. We recently mentioned in an article a point made by Connecticut eminent domain-abuse victim Carl Yacobacci that “eminent domain is a never-ending cycle of perpetual exposure to abuse.” (See: Tuesday, January 19, 2010, U.S. Supreme Court to Get a Doubleheader on NYS Eminent Domain Abuse? Pretext and Lack of Due Process PLUS No “Just Compensation”.) In that case he was making the point with respect the perpetual possibility of increasing density as a reason property can be taken, but the concern about “a never-ending cycle of perpetual exposure to abuse” applies to the wielding of any and all flimsy excuses.

Taking the Sidewalk Crack Standard of “Blight” to Ratner’s Brooklyn Heights Buildings

Let us show you the photos documenting the sidewalk cracks by virtue of which Forest City Ratner’s Brooklyn Heights buildings and the entire blocks they are on should all be condemned. First, below for visual reference, is the relevant standard for objectionable blight-establishing sidewalk cracks. Photos documenting the sidewalk cracks are from the "professional" blight-finding study prepared for Atlantic Yards by AKRF.
Ratner’s Blighted One Pierrepont Plaza

We start with the Forest City Ratner building that has sides (and sidewalk) along Clinton Street, Pierrepont Street and Cadman Plaza West.

To be fair, while there are cracks in the sidewalk in front of that building, those cracks are not the worst that can be found near the building or on the block as a whole. (There are also sidewalk cracks across the street.) In addition, we must note that some of the most atrocious looking sidewalks outside the Ratner building look atrocious not because of the way that they are cracked but because of the way that they were repaired.

Not fair to Ratner? When was Ratner ever fair to anyone else in this process? Furthermore, it doesn’t matter how bad the cracks are outside the Ratner buildings in particular are: Proceeding in the same way that our public agencies abuse these assessments. All that is required is to find cracks somewhere on the block and the whole block can be seized by eminent domain. As far as repaired sidewalks go, although repaired sidewalks don’t count as blight, the blight assessments our government agencies commission by contract simply assume that sidewalks can’t be repaired and that it is therefore more cost efficient to tear down the neighborhood to eliminate blight. The other reason that there might not have been as many cracks outside of the Ratner building is that in one area an expanse of new sidewalk was just recently put in. The building is relatively new (circa 1985) so the sidewalk must have deteriorated fast. We just didn’t get there in time to take photos before its recent replacement.
(Above: Upheaved sidewalk directly by main building entrance has been ground down to level out surface creating discoloration. Sidewalk has also been patched with concrete mismatched in color.)(Below: Entrance to Ratner building is in background as we proceed around the block.)
(Below: Having rounded the corner we are looking at the main Cadman Plaza West entrance to the Ratner building in the background.)
(Below: Front entrance to the building on Cadman Plaza West. Sidewalk is cracked in foreground.)
(Above: View from across the street.)
(Above and below: Back to the condition of sidewalks directly outside the Ratner property.)

Depths of Sidewalk “Blight” at Ratner’s The Heights at 94-110 Court Street


This building is another new (even newer, circa 2000) building. Again, were we to be fair in this process which is not meant to be fair, we would acknowledge that though the Ratner building has sidewalk cracks, there are worse cracks elsewhere on the block. No matter, either set of cracks could provide an eminent domain abuse-minded government agency to seize and demolish the full block.
(Below: The view from across the street.)
(Below: Proceeding around the block.)
How Well Does Forest City Ratner Take care of Its Property? Let’s Get a Little Windy

Given that we are writing today about how well Forest City Ratner takes care of its property we cannot help commenting on what happened only yesterday: Due to flying construction debris Forest City Ratner caused a shutdown a 15-block area of the city, including– and this is quite thematically fitting– all of City Hall (see the map below from the Tribecca Trib). Shutting down City Hall seems thematically fitting because when agencies like ESDC jump on the Bruce Ratner bandwagon to do his bidding, no-questions-asked, it often seems as if nobody is home in this city’s government offices.
According to WYNC, “On Sunday, the buildings department warned contractors to secure their construction sites because of the weather.” Forest City Ratner, now building what will be the city’s tallest residential building (77-stories, designed by Frank Gehry), didn’t follow those instructions at that site. It was big stuff, with the “fifteen block” area of the city, including City Hall shut down as a “frozen zone” for a substantial portion of the day the Commissioner of the city’s Office of Emergency Management had to get involved. A piece of metal flew all the way into City Hall Park. The City Buildings Commissioner went on WNYC radio to say that a stop work order had been issued against Forest City Ratner but sounded strangely solicitous of Forest City Ratner’s public relations interests when he proclaimed, almost in the same breath, that the Ratner site is “relatively well-run” and “It's such a large site and there are so many moving parts . . . . but I have to say this site in relation to other sites is one of the better sites.” As we just commented: “Anybody home?” When Forest City Ratner says `jump’, government officials say `how high?’

The WNYC story goes on to say:
The building, on Spruce Street, received nine other violations over the past six months for failing to keep the construction area free of debris, and other housekeeping issues.
(See: High Winds Scatter Debris from Beekman Tower, by Matthew Schuerman, January 25, 2010. See also WYNC’s: Stormy Weather Forces Downtown Street Closure, January 25, 2010)

For other coverage, see the Tibecca Trib at: High Winds Bring Debris Down from Beekman Tower, by Matt Dunning, Jan. 25, 2010. In the New York Times coverage which did not mention Ratner (or the Times relationship to Ratner), the event sounded less impressive and as if fewer city blocks were shut down. (See: January 25, 2010, Wind Wreaks Some Havoc, by Andy Newman and Micheline Maynard.)

And speaking of how much of the city Forest City Ratner should be able to take over or shut down. . .

Parting Words: The Real Reason to Condemn Forest City Ratner’s Property

Eminent domain can be used for a reason entirely different reason from sidewalk cracks. One of the most precedent-setting and conceptually challenging cases in which the U.S. Supreme Court dealt with eminent domain was Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984) which held that Hawaii could use eminent domain to break up and redistribute to a wider population land that was overwhelmingly concentrated in the hands of a few private landowners. We suggest, not entirely in jest, that a diminishment of Ratner’s mega-monopoly on prime Brooklyn Real estate is reason enough to use eminent domain to take Forest City Ratner’s properties away. We suggest this notwithstanding that the reason that government agencies are seizing properties from their owners in very desirable Brooklyn neighborhoods is almost certainly not really because there are sidewalk cracks, but because those public officials desire to accommodate the politically-favored Ratner in his quest to extend the range of his government-assisted mega-monopoly ever further.

(Below: A map of the proposed Forest City Ratner Mega-monopoly.)