Sunday, December 13, 2009

To Attorney General Andrew Cuomo and State Comptroller Thomas DiNapoli: Investigate and Halt Issuance of Arena Bonds

The following an open letter from Noticing New York to Attorney General Andrew Cuomo and State Comptroller Thomas DiNapoli calling for an investigation and halt to the proposed issuance of ESDC’s Brooklyn Local Development Corporation PILOT Revenue Bonds for Forest City Ratner’s proposed Nets basketball arena.

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December 13, 2009

Hon. Andrew M. Cuomo
Attorney General
Office of the Attorney General
of the State of New of New York
120 Broadway
New York, New York 10271-0002

Hon. Thomas P. DiNapoli
New York State Comptroller
New York State Office of the Comptroller
633 Third Avenue
New York, NY 10017


Re: New York State Public Authority Bonds Being Rushed to Market Without Proper, Adequate and Required Assessment, Disclosure and Approval of Risks (Empire State Development Corporation’s Proposed Financing of Nets Arena Via the Issuance of Its Subsidiary Corporation’s “Brooklyn Local Development Corporation PILOT Revenue Bonds, Barclay’s Center Project”)

Dear Attorney General Cuomo and Comptroller DiNapoli:

As you each have jurisdiction, capacity and, we respectfully submit, the duty to act in this area, we are writing to bring to your attention the fact that New York State public authority bonds are being rushed into the tax-exempt bond market without the required assessment, disclosure and approval of the risks associated with their issuance which in this case is substantial. The sale is being rushed to market (while a number of lawsuits are pending that ought to affect the issuance) in order to benefit Forest City Ratner hoping to meet a December 31, 2009 IRS deadline to obtain a tax-exempt status for which that private developer’s project would otherwise not qualify. (The goal is to avoid the provision of the IRS code enacted by Senator Moynihan that prohibits tax-exempt financing of private sports arenas and stadiums.) The risks being ignored in the process put the public, the state and the investors potentially buying these bonds in significant jeopardy.

We ask that you use your powers to investigate this issuance and, in the meantime, to order it halted as not being in compliance with minimum state requirements.

Here are just some of the things you need to know and about which you can readily learn more when you investigate:
1. Bonds Issued by Subsidiary Public Authority: (More than One Tranche). More than one series of bonds are being issued by the Brooklyn Arena Local Development Corp. a subsidiary public authority created by the Empire State Development Corporation as an instrument to bring this financing to market. The issuance of different series of bonds is being used in order to stratify the unacceptable risks of the transaction. The tax-exempt bonds would be paid with “PILOTS” diverting taxpayer revenues for the developer’s benefit.

2. Inadequate Assessment of Risk by the Rating Agencies. More than one series of bonds are being issued. Moody’s Investors Service and Standard & Poor’s (December 1, 2009) gave the senior bonds (i.e. the most credit worthy of the bonds being issued) respectively Baa3 and BBB-minus which means that these best-of-the-lot bonds being issued were given the very lowest investment-grade ratings possible, ratings just a notch above junk. However, the evidence is that these ratings do not reflect a proper assessment of actual risk. (Fitch did not rate these bonds.) Among other things:
a. Moody’s Cash Flow Review Mistake: Starting With 225 Annual Arena Events vs. 200. The Moody's review on the bonds was based upon a supposition that there would be 225 arena events per year while the evidence is that to assume even 200 arena events would be aggressive and inconsistent with the information that the developer itself has been able to promulgate. (There is no evidence of an independent market study or realistic recognition of the arena's competition with three or perhaps four regional arenas. - The consultant hired to do a market analysis made clear that “information provided to us by others was not audited or verified, and was assumed to be correct.” The “others” would be FCR.) When asked to address the significant 11% error in assessing the cash flow Moody’s was unable to respond.

b. Arena Completion Date Unrealistic. It is unrealistic to project that the arena will be completed by April or even June 2012, thus prolonging the duration of bond payments without any projected revenues.

c. Bonds Involve Provisions For Junior Bonds to Default: Atypical Absence of Cross-Default and Redemption. The bonds include provisions where the junior bonds can default, in which case a Russian billionaire, Mikhail Prokhorov, will be in litigation to take over the arena from the developer. The junior bonds are junk bonds quite likely to default. Mr. Prokohrov’s involvement in this transaction is as yet apparently unapproved by any public agency involved. In other words a background check and review have not been done. There is no provision for cross-default, acceleration or redemption in such an event. Given this atypical provision for a litigious transfer of the project we are at a loss to explain why the ratings for these bonds have not, accordingly, been reduced several notches. We do not believe these kinds of litigious difficulties were envisioned or similarly foreshadowed when bonds were issued for the new Yankees and Mets stadiums. The bonds for those baseball stadiums also deserve a respectively higher rating than these new proposed arena bonds given the proven track records of those teams in New York City. The New Jersey Nets have absolutely no track record. Forbes is reporting that the Nets are distributing 5200 free tickets a game, which is more than one-quarter of the house. Additionally, ratings for the Yankees and Mets stadium bonds were given before the national fiscal crisis. We understand that attendance for those teams has not been as good as was projected.

d. Risk of State Agency Non-Compliance With Public Authorities Accountability Act. One Significant risk to the transaction is that the half of the land required for the transaction (the half the developer is not attempting to take through eminent domain) will not be obtainable because of a violation of the Public Authorities Accountability Act. Despite the fact that these bonds are being issued by a state public authority and that this will pose a significant risk to any buyers of these bonds the assessment of the question of whether there was a state agency violation of this law is not being offered by state officials but by the developer. The Preliminary Offering Statement seeks to assure the buyers of the bonds with the private developer’s self-interested assessment that the developer: “believes that the MTA complied with all applicable legal requirements and expects that the [defendants] will prevail in this proceeding.” We also note that this assessment is not in the form of a legal opinion.

e. Errors in Offering Statement. The Preliminary Official Statement Being used to market the bonds contains other inconsistencies and inaccuracies that go to the question of how many arena events will be generating cash flow for the bonds and the basis for ratings. (See next section.)
In assessing the reliability of the ratings agencies we point out that in a front page story the New York Times offered this assessment of the current state of affairs: “. . for now, and for the foreseeable future, the market for ratings is sure to look uncannily similar to the one that helped usher in the crisis: three rivals, all of them paid by issuers, bestriding the market.” (See: Debt Raters Avoid Overhaul After Crisis, By David Segal, December 08, 2009.)

3. Inaccuracies in the Preliminary Official Statement (POS) relating to number of possible events in the arena.
a. Non-Profit Arena Events for Community Go Missing. The Preliminary Official Statement (POS) being used to sell the bonds says that each year NO MORE THAN TEN EVENTS (“not to exceed ten (10) events”) shall be held in the arena for the public and community groups at the FULL COST of normal events in the arena (“which access shall be on the same terms, including cost, as the Arena is generally made available to other Persons for use”). Inconsistently, the developer has already promised the public that there will be AT LEAST TEN EVENTS which will be at a LOWER COST to the public with the developer forgoing profit on the minimum ten events. (Alternately: “a minimum of 10 events would be made available for use by community groups at a reasonable cost (generally the cost of operation) with any net proceeds to the sponsor from these events to be donated to not-for-profit organizations” and “at least ten (10) events per year, at a reasonable rate, with net proceeds from such events to be used to support non-profit community organizations.”) In other words, that subtracts out a minimum of at least another ten events a year from the 220 projected profit-making events.

b. Misrepresentation on Possible Hockey Team. The POS claims that simply by retrofitting the arena with “ice-making abilities” the arena can house a NHL hockey team and thus bring it the revenue associated with that team. This representation offers absurd hope for mitigating risk because the evidence clearly shows that the arena is physically too small to include a hockey rink. This is highly material because if a hockey team plays in an arena, the team plays a minimum of 43 home games per year and as many as 55.
4. Bonds Far Riskier than Transaction Approved by the State Public Authorities Control Board (PACB). (As furnished to and consented to by the State Comptroller’s Office.) The bonds being issued are far riskier and for a very different transaction than was approved by the State Public Authorities Control Board (PACB). As required by the governing state legislation that original transaction was also sent to, commented upon and the approval determination was consented to by the State Comptroller’s Office. The new transaction which has not been approved by the PACB also lacks that statutorily required comptroller review, input and consent. The new transaction is much riskier and different from what was approved because:
a. The arena (supposed to generate income) is 20% smaller. The PACB (and the ESDC board) approved a transaction that involved the financing of an 850,000 square foot arena, not the 20% smaller 675,000 square foot arena that developer Forest City Ratner currently plans to build.

b. The arena (needing to be paid for with generated income) is substantially more costly. At the time the PACB issued an approval, the arena was projected to cost $637.2 million, only a fraction of the $1.1 billion (including infrastructure) it is currently projected to cost according to the recent disclosures of the Preliminary Offering Statement. $1.1 billion represents an increase of 73% over $637.2 million.

c. The arena is less functional. The smaller arena will be less functional. The diminished functionality means among other things that, as noted above, the arena will not (as would previously have been possible) be able to host an NHL hockey team with 43-55 arena events per year.

d. Larger Atlantic Yards financing now a decades-long option for the developer. The larger Atlantic Yards megadevelopment as part of which the arena financing was approved has also changed very substantially (and is much more undefined than ever). It is now a muti-decade option on multi-acre mega-monopoly on the part of the developer that will involve subjecting the community to years of unnecessary developer-created blight as parts of the community are torn down and once-thriving alternative development is stymied.
5. No ESDC Board Approval for Smaller Arena. Not only has the PACB not approved the far riskier and different transaction being brought to the bond market; the ESDC board members have also not acted to approve the financing of the new smaller arena that Forest City Ratner proposes to build.

6. PACB Approval (and Comptroller Review and Consent) and Public Policy of Requiring Public Benefit: $220 Million Net Loss. While it may be argued whether the PACB and the Comptroller take into account the generation of public benefit and public policy issues when they conduct their review of proposed project financings, it should be noted that the transaction now getting underway involves no benefit to the public, whereas the transaction that was previously brought to the PACB and the Comptroller’s office for approval did. The New York City Independent Budget Office has reviewed the new arena financing transaction being brought to market and concluded that it will represent a $220 million net loss to the public ($39.5 million in direct losses and $180.5 million in opportunity losses). That is not the total cost to the public: That is the current project net loss; the project will cost much more.

7. Secret Approval of Additional $400 million in Bonds For Arena That Will Substantivally Increase Total Net Loss to the Public. On September 17th the public authorities issuing these bonds secretively and in violation of the New York State open meetings and sunshine laws approved the groundwork to issue another $400 million in tax-exempt infrastructure bonds, the proceeds of which can be turned over to the developer to reimburse it for its costs of building the arena, thus significantly boosting the net loss to the public of this transaction. Those additional bonds have also not been approved by the PACB or the comptroller. Absent a recission of these actions by the public authorities there can be no assurance that the public is not about to be saddled with these extra undisclosed costs.

8. Bonds Negative Effect on Credit of the State. Though the taxpayer-backed bonds are technically non-recourse to the state for additional funds in the event of a default, the state is still in jeopardy due to their riskiness. Though there is no state guarantee of the bonds, state public authority officials have not ruled out the possibility that the state would rescue the bonds in the event of their default. One possible backdoor method being set up to effect such rescue is the secretly approved issuance (at taxpayer expense) of the additional $400 million in bonds described in the above paragraph. Even if the state were not to rescue the bonds, the PACB was created to review and approve the issuance of all bonds, including such non-recourse or limited-recourse bonds issued by state authorities because the negative effect of default on the state and all other state issuers is recognized.

9. Public Authorities Out of Control? We believe that you each independently have authority to step in to halt these transactions and investigate them. To say that such is not the case would be to say that our public authorities are extraordinarily out of control.
It is not the purpose of this letter to criticize your fellow politicians and public officials, but it is important to note that the issuance of these bonds is being played out against an Alice-in-Wonderland denial to the public of realities, fiscal and others, by holders of public office who should be exercising their oversight to restrain the abuses in these transactions:
1. Denial of Responsibility by Mayor Bloomberg. Bloomberg has denied the financial facts of excessive subsidy for Ratner Atlantic Yards mega-monology with incredible assertions both preceding and following his actions. On Wednesday, May 20th Bloomberg publicly said that the Atlantic Yards project would receive no more subsidy. On May 29th it was revealed that a deal was in the works to give millions more, what turned out to be a package worth more than $180 million in additional no-bid subsidies to Ratner. These subsidies facilitated by the mayor (which can still be halted) are being given to Ratner via handouts from the MTA’s board, approved by the mayor’s representatives. Just this week, commenting on the MTA’s lack of funds (the $200 million shortfall in its 2009 budget), Bloomberg, as if he himself was not responsible, said: "I don't know why anybody is surprised at what is happening to the MTA," . . . "It's a piggy bank that keeps getting raided.”

2. Denial by Governor Paterson. As of last Wednesday, Governor Paterson announced that New York State, with only $3 million of cash on hand, is running out of money. He has been urging legislators to find ways to cut back on state spending and speaking about the dire cutbacks that he will be forced to make without the legislature taking action. Yet how can Governor Paterson expect legislators to take him seriously about legislative branch-controlled spending when he has refused to do anything about Atlantic Yards, which is the premier example of executive branch-controlled pork barrel spending. Upon her recent departure from the state housing finance agencies, Housing Finance Agency CEO Priscilla Almodovar commented caustically about the cronyism of housing approved by the Pataki administration. There can be no better example of such Pataki administration cronyism than its attempted no-bid award of a huge mega-monoply on Brooklyn development to Forest City Ratner.
Necessary Investigation of Eminent Domain Abuses. Finally we must also raise with you the background of eminent domain abuse by state and city officials about which the state Attorney General’s office has initiated investigations respecting conduct relating to Willets Point. The situation with respect to Willets Point involving misconduct by city officials is not an isolated incident. (We are aware of news reports that the Bloomberg administration has been resisting subpoenas from the Attorney General’s office by countering with political threats.) It is tip of a much larger iceberg. As you found, your investigation into Willets Point quickly expanded into investigating activities of the Brooklyn Downtown Partnership, which brings it very close to Atlantic Yards itself. (You should probably also be looking at Coney Island as well.)

The recent decision in the Kaur case respecting the abuse of eminent domain by Columbia University makes this clear how far the abuse of eminent domain by government officials extends. We borrow the language of lawyer, legal scholar, and eminent domain expert Gideon Kanner summarizing his assessment of what happened in Kaur:
. . . in the Kaur case, the New York Appellate Division did examine the unseemly facts underlying the decision to condemn and found them to give rise to a miasma of favoritism, conflict of interest, procedural mistreatment of the condemnees, and deliberate blighting of the area.
The cast of characters in the Kaur case (substituting Forest City Ratner for Columbia University) is virtually identical. The facts of abuse are very much the same, in some respects even worse. They need to be investigated. Senator Perkins has written a letter to Governor Paterson asking for a state moratorium on the use of eminent domain in which he offers his opinion that the “actions on the part of the ESDC are part of an insidious form of discrimination and civil rights violations that must not stand.”

We suggest that investigation needs to start now, not in six months or a year from now. We suggest that your investigation should also extend to how in the case of Atlantic Yards public officials have coordinated such abuses of eminent domain with other illegal acts such as the non-compliance of the MTA with the Public Authorities Accountability Act. The investigation should commence before New York is subjected to a wasteland such as was left in New London, Connecticut in the aftermath of the Kelo decision and before these rushed-to-market bonds default.

From this brief list of problems it should be evident that the skimping on due diligence and normal procedures in service of the private developer's deadline poses great risk to the State, the public and the potential buyers of these bonds. Once again, we believe investigation by each of your offices will find serious problems and wrongdoing in the financing process such that an immediate halt to this unapproved financing transaction is warranted.


Sincerely,


Michael D. D. White

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