(Above, - click to enlarge- Battery Park City, viewed from the north on the Hudson and an image from the Municipal Art Society's "Atlantic Lots" images of what Brooklyn faces over the next several decades as Forest City Ratner slowly proceeds with his mega-monopoly. We updated the image with the Prokhorov/Ratner basketball arena. Original aerialphotography of the yards by Jonathan Barkey.)
With apparently no compunction or sense of the appalling irony of it all, ESDC has gone into court swearing that they have given the time and thought necessary to compare the inexcusable Forest City Ratner Atlantic Yards project they endorse with that exemplar of large-scale development projects, Battery Park City.
For years we have been holding Battery Park City side-by-side with Atlantic Yards in order to stress by comparison what a bad large-scale project Atlantic Yards is. Even as recently as a few weeks ago we invoked the Battery Park City model when speaking with Senator Charles E. Schumer to make explicit why his continuing support for Atlantic Yards is misguided and sanctions unprecedented favoritism for a single developer mega-monopoly. (See: Wednesday, April 28, 2010, Schumer Says Atlantic Yards Area Is Not Blighted. Doesn’t See AY As A Ratner Mega-Monopoly, But Could His Support Wane?).
Atlantic Yards Report carried the story Monday that ESDC was attempting to invoke the inestimable good grace in which Battery Park City is held to counter the dismay provoked by Atlantic Yards documents that provide for the potential (some would say extreme likelihood ) that Atlantic Yards will involve“25 years of construction in Prospect Heights rather than the announced and promised ten years.” ESDC pointed to Battery Park City to argue that this wouldn’t be so bad and that presumably the promised 10 years should be considered no different from current 25 years provided for. Atlantic Yards Report’s Norman Oder pointed out that this embarrassingly little feint was despite the fact that there were some “key contrasts” between the projects. (See: Monday, May 03, 2010, The slow buildout at Battery Park City, according to the ESDC, serves as an acceptable example for Atlantic Yards. Except it doesn't.)
Actually 25 years might better be considered the new “promise” in place of the old 10 year promise. The real likelihood is that the Ratner’s mega-project will take 30 to 40 years if we heed former ESDC head Marisa Lago’s comparison of the time frame for the expected Atlantic Yards mega-project to Roosevelt Island’s progress which at 40 years and counting is still going on.
Atlantic Yards Report Identifies “Key Contrasts”
The Atlantic Yards Report listed the following “key “key contrasts” between the projects in italics below:
• “Battery Park City is 92 acres, more than four times the 22-acre Atlantic Yards site, so the impact of staged development has been more attenuated.”
• “It was built on a landfill, with no established neighborhood and longstanding street grid.” This, we should point out, means that there was no eminent domain abuse to seize and destroy recently renovated residences, historically valuable structures and thriving business. Destruction and eminent domain were also not being used to eliminate rival competing development. Tellingly, the approach to building Battery Park City was for each new site built upon to be immediately adjacent to, essentially laminated onto, already developed properties with development thereby taking advantage of, and continually flowing out from, a grid with existing buildings into never before developed areas. By contrast, the Atlantic Yards approach is to quickly and aggressively destroy and create a hole in the existing grid and then wait decades before filling it in again.
• “At Battery Park City, large portions of the 36 acres of open space were built first, while with Atlantic Yards, the buildings would come first.” In other words the Battery Park City model involved an infrastructure-first approach to create immediate value in the area before bidding out the building sites.
• “Battery Park City involves multiple developers and multiple parcels, rather than a single developer controlling one site, choosing to move forward as it sees fit, with light penalties and many excuses for delay.”
We Chime in With a Few More “Key Contrasts”
As a comment to the AYR post we offered some other distinctions not mentioned (whether they might have been implied or not- we are sorry if with the last two bullets we are a tad repetitious of what we slipped in above):
* The many multiple developers of Battery Park City also had to BID for the sites they were developing. The sites were put out to bid when the government wanted them developed and project readiness was a factor in the process so the public was getting what it specified it wanted in nearly immediate real-time terms. The public also gets top price by bidding out a prepared site among multiple developers ready and raring to go as opposed to having to take the steep discount for the land subjected to the presupposition that Forest City Ratner should get monopoly rights on property decades before being ready to proceed.
* As we previously pointed out, if all these acres were not already being handed to Forest City Ratner as a single-developer megadevelopment, the government could be putting people to work right now in the slow economy to prepare the site with infrastructure (including open space, if the design included any) just as was done at Battery park City. (See: Tuesday, April 27, 2010, Surprised? MTA Restructures the Hudson Yards Deal; Developer Cherry Picks More Benefit While Public Keeps the Risk.)
* Eminent domain abuse (and pretext of blight) was not being used to quash other naturally occurring, ongoing competing and desirable development.
* Lastly, a distinction nobody thinks about: In the case of Battery Park City the developer(s) selected for the sites to go forward did not own other immediately adjacent developable sites (outside the formally designated project) which will now lie fallow and undeveloped for many decades because of the preferential deal given to Ratner that helps him wipe out competition from neighboring property. Remember that together with property that Ratner previously acquired for development from the government Ratner owns and controls 30 contiguous acres of development rights on which he intends to have 20 towers, plus his malls plus his arena when (in forty or so years) he is done. (See: Wednesday, April 28, 2010, Schumer Says Atlantic Yards Area Is Not Blighted. Doesn't See AY As A Ratner Mega-Monopoly, But Could His Support Wane?.)
The List of“Key Contrasts” Goes On When We Think About It
To the above bulleted points let us add some more contrasts:
• The design of Battery Park City is carefully superb. It avoids (which Atlantic Yards doesn’t) the discredited tower-in-the park approach. (See: Tuesday, August 5, 2008, Two, and Fro? and Monday, September 22, 2008, Should a Teardrop be Shed- Considering the Burden?) (Above, in the archaic and discredited superblock tradition, the two largest blocks above are comprised of what were previously five individual blocks. Even accommodating the insertion of the massive arena into the brownstone neighborhood there should still be at least four individual blocks and there is an attractive opportunity for there to be more than five blocks as suggested in the community's proposed UNITY plan which would probably be the case if this were fit into the grid of Battery park City.)
• It also shuns the superblocks embraced by the Atlantic Yards project for the wrong reason, see next bullet. (See again: Monday, September 22, 2008, Should a Teardrop be Shed- Considering the Burden?)
(Above, a generic rendering showing scale from the Municipal Art Society's Atlantic Lots. Original aerialphotograph by Jonathan Barkey.)
• The reason that Atlantic Yards involves superblocks is so that by virtue of the city’s having given Forest City Ratner private possession of the city’s streets, sidewalks and avenues for free Ratner will be able to construct at an unprecedented higher density, a density that will be the densest area in North America. At almost twice the density of Battery park City (which has the relief of looking out at the Hudson) it does not constitute good planning. (Saturday, November 29, 2008, Jane Jacobs Atlantic Yards Report Card #4: Appropriate Density? NO.) Battery Park City doesn’t involve abrupt changes in density and scale from adjacent city areas to another with the density being piled onto the property owned by a politically-favored developer at the expense of neighbors deprived of the right to own property of a comparable density. (See: Friday, September 26, 2008 Weighing Scale.)
(Below, a rendering that shows the abrupt and huge change in scale density of Atlantic Yards as opposed to the surrounding community.)
• Battery Park City is about 40% parkland with 36 of its 92 acres devoted to park space. Atlantic Yards has no true comparable public park areas and some of the green roof area that was once considered to be part of its “park” or “green” space has been eliminated form the designs.
Will Justice Marcy Friedman Pay Attention to the “Key Contrasts”
In the best of worlds all of the above really ought to matter to the judge in the case. However, the comparison of Atlantic Yards is coming up specifically because ESDC is arguing that Supreme Court Justice Marcy Friedman should not order new more suitable environmental findings because of the change in time frames from the promised 10 years to the currently acknowledged 25 years (or the not yet officially unacknowledged 30 or 40). (This despite what Justice Friedman has already euphemistically termed ESDC’s “deplorable lack of transparency" with more of it having come recently to light.)
That means that what should matter most to Justice Friedman among the bulleted items are:
• those that relate to project readiness (like the way that Battery Park City proceeded by giving sites to developers ready to go, not those endeavoring to restrain competition), and
• issues concerning the ways that Atlantic Yards affects the livability in the city, like the way it is destroying an existing city fabric to replace it with nothing for decades.
(Above, the Prokhorov/Ratner basketball arena- aka "Barclays Arena" the first and only part of Ratner's mega-monopoly likely to be built in the near term which will be a very expensive net loss for the public.)
Query: Does it matter from an environmental standpoint that the harm to the public is being done specifically to benefit the developer with no thought to benefiting the public? Because that is almost certainly what accounts for all the ways these two projects are so dramatically different from each other. This favoritism is the most key contrast of all.
(Above, a housing subsidy schedule for the Atlantic Yards mega-monopoly from which a greater total for subsidy figures can be calculated. Click to enlarge.)
Forest City Ratner is looking to glom onto an awful lot of housing subsidy with respect to its proposed Atlantic Yards megadevelopment. If you’re interested in knowing how much, this article attempts to close in on that figure. It’s in the neighborhood of about at least half a billion dollars, probably a fair amount more and the transaction has been set up so Forest City Ratner can blackmail the public for that money.
Atlantic Yards Report FOILs Atlantic Yards Arena Bond Sale Closing Documents
Thanks to the assiduous Freedom of Information Act work and analysis of Norman Oder, who is posting Atlantic Yards Closing documents on his Atlantic Yards Report, we are getting a much more detailed picture about how beneficial the mega-project deal is intended to be for Forest City Ratner. With each new unveiling of documents and the accompanying analysis we see more evidence confirming that the dominant purpose of the mega-scheme being effected by public officials is to serve the developer’s interest. See AYR’s January 26, 2010 (Tuesday) roundup article with it compilation of links, A round-up of news generated by the master closing documents (also covered by Develop Don’ Destroy Brooklyn: The Master Closing Documents, Revealed, 1.26.10), which links we are duplicating below (all seven articles were posted Monday, January 25, 2010):
HDC’s $144 Million Second Mortgage Subsidy For Not Much Affordability of Units In Return
The first of those articles listed above is the one from which we obtained the “Combination Housing Subsidies”schedule appearing in the image at the beginning of this post. That schedule provides a better window than we have had before on the amount of housing subsidy Forest City Ratner will be angling to obtain by virtue of the control that government agencies are giving Ratner (without any true or effective bid) over a vast mega-monopoly of prime Brooklyn real estate. (Monday, January 25, 2010, New documents hint at potential affordable housing dodge: "all-affordable buildings" with no low-income units, but subsidized units at market rates.)
The “Combination Housing Subsidies”schedule sets forth a number of possible occupancy “scenarios” for the project but only one of those scenarios, “Scenario #1,” matches (with some discrepancies) the proposed occupancy of the mega-project that people have actually been talking and which was theoretically negotiated to the community’s benefit by ACORN. We say “theoretically” because the occupancy consists essentially of:
• Affordable low-income units that are required by the tax code and would have to be in the project anyway. • An income band (right above the income bands that the federal tax code will require) where families with incomes from $38,407.00 or 50% of AMI to $46,087 or 60% of AMI would specifically be ineligible to get affordable units in the mega-project, and • Units above that specified income band that would be essentially what you could expect the market, unassisted by subsidy, to provide in the area.
(Below the official schedule of income and rents released in July 2006 by Forest City Ratnershowing adjustments for family size and not explicitly showing the missing income band denied affordable housing. It uses earlier, lower, out-of-date income figures and rents. Click to enlarge.) To read more about how ACORN essentially shilled for FCR by negotiating no real public benefit, see: July 24, 2008, Falling Acorn! How Far from the Tree? and Saturday, June 28, 2008, Selling out the Community for Beans (A Giant Wrong).)
How much is this so-called “affordable” occupancy that is so favorable to the developer going to cost public agencies in terms of the housing subsidies Ratner intends to garner by providing it?
Calculating $144 Million
The “Combination Housing Subsidies”schedule sets forth an example that lets us know about how much some of that subsidy from coming from the new York City Housing Development Corporation will be if you just do a little calculating. For a building of 400 units it will be $12,800,000. Since Forest City Ratner is actually supposed to build 4,500 non-condominium units receiving that subsidy the total cost of this particular subsidy would come to $144 million. That’s if Ratner fulfills its theoretical obligation to build these units. The “Combination Housing Subsidies”schedule contains at the top a mathematical example of how the subsidy would be calculated although the example contains an obvious typographical error that needs to be corrected with respect to the math:
For example, if the first tower built on the Arena Block contains 400 residential units under Scenario #1: where 50% of the units (200 units) would have rents set at market rate, 10% (40 units) at 150% AMI, 10% (40 units) at 120% AMI, 10% at 80% AMI (40 units), 17% at 48% AMI (68 units) and 3% at 38% AMI (12 units), and the associated subsidy would be $12,864,000 [sic, actually $12,800,000] in HDC/HPD 2nd mortgage subsidy ($65,000 x 40 at 120% AMI, $85 x 120 units at or below 80% AMI).
Adding the $144 Million to the Total of Previously Calculated Subsidies
That, of course, is neither the total amount of the subsidy proposed to be going to Atlantic Yards nor the entire amount when it comes to just the housing subsidies. We have previously calculated the total subsides for at Atlantic Yards at between $2 to $3 billion, providing a schedule of known subsides in April of 2008 that added up $2,157,260,000 with additional unknown figures being identified but not added in. (See: Your 'Net' Loss: $2B in Taxes to Ratner, By Rich Calder, April 14, 2008.) At the time we had done some calculations of what this HDC second mortgage subsidy (which we expected) would be but we did not add in a figure for it because we were not reasonably sure what it would actually be. (We had conservatively calculated it at $110 million so we were not terribly far off from the $144 million figure it is now turning out to be.)
Arena Subsidy Calculation Needs To Be Updated
The overall schedule for all the subsidies that Atlantic Yards is proposed to be receiving needs to be updated though the $2 to $3 billion overall estimate is still basically correct. In particular, some subsidy costs respecting the arena need to be revised downward because tax exempt bonds have been issued in a lower amount than we used in our last set of calculations, while other arena subsidy amounts need to be revised upwards. The city has slipped more money to the developer, ESDC is advancing monies ahead of schedule, the MTA is getting a less desirable rail yard and it is a rail yard that may cost the MTA more in the long run because it won’t be flexible enough to meet the MTA’s real future needs, an additional $400 million in tax-exempt bonds was secretly authorized which may be used to bail out or to give the developer some extra gifts in the future. The MTA has also essentially given away for free to Ratner the right to name its subway stops in the area of the project.
Housing Subsidies When taken Alone
Let us then tally up just some housing subsidies including this new $144 million figure.
$261.25 million: We can still estimate that the cost of the tax-exempt bonds for the housing will be $261.25 million. That is the combined cost to the city ($11.47), state ($20.96) and federal ($228.82) taxpayers (NYC residents are all three) of the tax exemption of the bonds. (Unlike the calculations with respect to the arena bonds where local real property taxes are diverted to pay the bonds we do not need to include the cost of such a diversion in the total cost of the bonds to the public.)
$18 million: Next we still include an estimated $18 million for Low Income Housing Tax Credit credits, based on conservative estimated basis of $320,000 per low income unit and LIHTC of $20,000 each for 900 units.
$39.37 million: Mortgage Recording Tax Exemption- Mortgage recording tax is 2.8% in NYC- At least the residential rental portion will be exempt from the tax.
$150 million: “Atlantic Yards Carve-Out”—the provision that gave Forest City Ratner a special bonus in the revision of the 421-a tax law.
That then totals $638.67 million. It does not yet include the millions that might need to be included for sales tax exemption on the residential units. It does not include the millions the MTA has given Ratner by selling its rail yards to Ratner for substantially less than their value. It does not include the millions the state and the city are giving Ratner for infrastructure costs. Very importantly it does not include the almost inconceivably huge giveaways to Ratner by virtue of a.) allowing Ratner to acquire much of the land for the project by paying much less than its value through the abuse of eminent domain and then, b.) making Ratner the special beneficiary of a tremendous upzoning at the expense of his neighbors.
The above figure also does not include any calculations with respect to a vague and complexly conditioned “commitment to build 600 . . for-sale units on or offsite is in the final development agreement.” The building of those units is predicated upon the receipt of an unspecified amount of subsidy. The amount of that subsidy would surely exceed another $15 million or perhaps even twice that. (If there were more such for-sale units, “1000" is mentioned as an upper limit, adjust those numbers proportionately.)
Is It Possible the Housing Subsidies Would Be Less?
It is possible (though perhaps not probable) that there could be circumstances where less housing subsidy would be delivered to the mega-project than Ratner is likely envisioning. As Atlantic Yards Report’s Norman Oder points out, these involve alternate scenarios (which can be seen in the “Combination Housing Subsidies” schedule) with the provision of less “affordable” housing than ACORN and other project proponents have been telling the public to expect. Atlantic Yards Report says:
It offers several more scenarios regarding affordable housing in the Atlantic Yards project, promising affordable units with no low-income units far less affordability to the constituents of ACORN, the advocacy organization that supplied the most foot soldiers at public hearings in favor of the project.
It opens up the possibility of subsidized buildings that are "100% affordable," with the majority of units aimed at households earning 165% of Area Median Income, or AMI.
Further, respecting the estimated $18 million in Low Income Housing Tax Credits, there appears to be another typo in the “Combination Housing Subsidies”schedule: It contains two statements apparently at odds with each other respecting whether Low Income Housing tax credits will be available to the project:
Scenarios 1, 5 & 6 assume that HDC will provide recycled private activity tax exempt bonds.
(Meaning Low Income Housing Tax Credits will not be available.)
and
Scenarios 1, 5 & 6 assume that HDC will provide new private activity bond cap to generate as-of-right 4% Federal Low Income Housing Tax Credits on qualifying units.
(Meaning Low Income Housing Tax Credits will be available.)
Diversion of Scarce Subsidies to Ratner
Here is what makes subsidies like the $144 million of newly calculable HDC 2nd mortgage subsidy, the $261.25 million in benefit from scarce tax-exempt bonds, and the Low Income Housing Tax credit sums going to Ratner especially important: Clearly Ratner is proposed to get more than a half billion dollars in scarce subsidies that could be going to other developers and better (actually worthwhile) projects. (In terms of scarcity, all or most of the $144 million HDC is providing is coming from a limited source: Monies that come from Battery Park City luxury, market rate units that were permitted to be built in lieu of the moderate rate housing that was originally supposed to be built there.)
The transaction has been set up to enable Forest City Ratner to blackmail the public to send those subsidies to Atlantic Yards at the expense of worthier projects. This is reflective of the way that the Atlantic Yards transaction has always been structured to give the developer an upper hand and the tactics are similar to the kind of negotiating Ratner has engaged in before with respect to its Beekman Tower project.
Beekman Blackmail
Ratner twice threatened to cease construction of its Beekman Tower project. The first time was in the summer of 2008. As reported then, Forest City Ratner threatened“to halt construction of the new school on Beekman St. unless they receive a 20-year tax break from the city.” Ratner was able to blackmail the community board to get its approval because the community was at that point already dependant on plans for the school. Not a nice form of payback since it should probably be considered that placing the school in the project was a benefit to Forest City Ratner in the first place. (See: Monday, September 8, 2008, Endorsements for Paul Newell for 64th Assembly District Seat.)
The second time Ratner made threats respecting a halt construction of the Beekman Tower it was the spring of 2009 and Ratner was threatening to build the building to half its originally planned height. Publicly the halt was to negotiate a better deal from the construction companies putting up the building. Because of a change in the economic climate Ratner was able rewrite the deal more to its benefit. Though it was never acknowledged, it is also possible that Ratner was having problems getting the credit in the credit markets it needed to be able to issue the final tranche of bonds to complete the project.
The tower was being financed by bonds issued by the New York City Housing Development Corporation (the same city-controlled public authority being asked to give Ratner the bonds and $144 million second mortgage subsidy). Although a spokesman for HDC told Norman Oder that it wasn’t a big deal if the building was only half completed, the truth is that HDC would then have gotten far fewer affordable units and far less bang for buck the in return for its financing and state tax exempt volume cap. (See: Friday, March 20, 2009, If FCR's Beekman Tower faces 50% cut, what does that say about Atlantic Yards promises (and designs)?)
Ideally HDC should have been in a position where its documents would have given it the right to object to the downsizing. There might have also been reason for HDC to object to an after-the-fact squeeze of the contractor since that kind of thing can lead to problems. There were, in fact, recent severe problems at the site during a January windstorm. (See: Tuesday, January 26, 2010, Forest City Ratner’s Two Buildings In Brooklyn Heights Need to be Condemned!)
Ratner Allowed to Blackmail For Housing Subsidy By Delaying Provision of Housing
Specifically, Ratner is entitled to eight years of such delay in providing the housing just with respect to Phase I of the project. Here is the language (emphasis supplied):
G) Notwithstanding AYDC's and Interim Developer's obligations to Substantially Complete (or cause to be Substantially Completed) the Phase I Improvements by the Outside Phase I Substantial Completion Date, so long as the Affordable Housing Application Requirements have been satisfied in each case, any Affordable Housing Subsidy Unavailability with respect to a proposed residential building shall result in a one-year extension of the Outside Phase I Substantial Completion Date solely with respect to the gross square feet proposed for Affordable Housing Units in such building in the application for financing such Affordable Housing Units, up to an aggregate of eight (8) one-year extensions of such Outside Phase I Substantial Completion Date; provided, however the aggregate gross square feet eligible for such extension for Affordable Subsidy Unavailability shall in no event exceed 450,000 gross square feet in any year.
Ratner’s Ability to Pay An “Option Renewal Fee” In Order To Not Complete Within Originally Specified Decades
While Forest City Ratner is theoretically entitled to a total of eight years delay in the delivery of housing with respect to the first phase of the project, this is only the delay that Ratner is entitled to without paying for the delay. As observed by Norman Oder in the above Atlantic Yards Report article, Ratner has not only been given a very long time* to complete the mega-project without any penalty, twenty-five years in all, in addition the amounts that Ratner then has to pay for failure to complete within this specified are negligible.
(Here is the AYR summary of the specified schedule: • six years to build the arena • three or four years to start construction of the first tower • five or six years to start construction of the second tower • ten years to start construction of the third tower • 12 years to build Phase 1 (which can be much smaller than officially promised) • 15 years to start construction of the platform over the railyard • 25 years to finish the project (which can be much smaller than officially promised)
ESDC in its documents has styled the amounts that Ratner has to pay for failure to meet the very generous schedule above as “penalties” which serves as window dressing to the notion that ESDC is controlling the developer, forcing Ratner to meet a schedule, but given the very small amounts Ratner has to pay when not hewing to the schedule, the amounts could better be described as payments for an “extension of Ratner’s option on the property” (very small option amounts at that). Perhaps they should merely be thought of as “expression of interest” payments. As Atlantic Yards Report puts it:
The damages Forest City Ratner faces in most cases--less than $10 million for an arena that's up to three years late, $5 million for each of three buildings if they're late--don't represent a lot of money, especially given that the developer just got a cash flow boost of $31 million to buy land.
That’s $5 million for a single building, for example the third tower on the arena block that would paid 18 years from now (the 10 years in the schedule above plus the 8 year housing subsidy extension), a “penalty” that will procure for Ratner an unspecified period of additional years. At most it would come to $80 million for all sixteen towers. Obviously, the present value of the amounts paid will be lower when paid so far in the future. We invite any of our readers to identify any time they know of when a smaller percentage has been charged for such a long-term extension of an option to develop land. Lastly, since Forest City Ratner could still threaten not to build the housing unless the “penalty”/”option renewal fee” was waived (or subsidy increased to pay for it) those amounts may never be paid at all.
Blackmailing Rather Than Bidding For More Than a Half Billion in Housing Subsidy
It is sometimes bemoaned by those who actually want sports arenas built in their cities (we think they are disastrous economic boondoggles) that the owners of sports teams make localities bid against each other for the “privilege” of having such facilities located in their cities. Conversely, normally when housing projects are proposed, their developers have to show that they would be more beneficial than alternative deals by other developers in order to claim subsidy, in essence a form of bid process. That’s the way it should be. (If ownership of Atlantic Yards were broken up it would be still be possible.) Here, however, ESDC has structured a deal where that process will be reversed. Forest City Ratner wants to lay claim to more than a half billion in housing subsidy that could (and actually should) be going to other developers. But Forest City Ratner won’t have to deliver a better project to get that subsidy. They can actually deliver a far worse, much more expensive one. Forest City Ratner won’t have to think in terms of “bidding” to get their project funded with subsidy. Because they have been given a multi-decade mega-monopoly they can blackmail the public for those subsidies. And partly because so much density has been piled on top of this site that will come with a mega-tab for the public to pay.
Listening to a report tonight on NPR’s All Things Considered about how the federal stimulus bill was affecting the construction industry we heard the following:
With private capital all but dried up many contractors who normally work on private construction projects are now bidding on the public sector jobs funded by the stimulus. One benefit of so many contractors seeking the work is that bids for stimulus construction projects are coming in below expectations, meaning that there may be more money available to fund more projects later on.
We have also heard Forest City Ratner’s explanation for why it is stopping work on its Beekman project near City Hall: That it wants to similarly take advantage of the current economic climate by rebidding the construction work “with contractors eager for work.” (See: Monday, March 30, 2009, Forest City Enterprises announces losses, asserts that AY arena is one of only two new projects to launch in 2009.) (We suspect that something else is actually preventing the Beekman from proceeding at this time. . . Might it not have to do with the way Forest City Ratner’s financials and credit rating are tubing, added to the way that NYC commercial real estate assets like the Beekman are not underwriting the way they did nine months ago?)
So state and local governments everywhere else are saving significant money on public sector work by getting bids during this economic downturn, and Forest City Ratner claims it is similarly going to reduce costs for itself through the lower bids they can get during the economic downturn. . . Who isn’t invited to the party to get the benefits of such bidding? The New York taxpayers who are expected to shoulder the unbelievably huge subsidies (more than $2.1 billion) being given to Forest City Ratner, without bid, for its proposed Atlantic Yards project! That is because, our politicians gave Ratner (without any bid) a multi-decade monopoly on a 22-acre site which, in theory, precludes competition for perhaps 40 years.
Are our politicians really telling us with straight faces that they have made a deal with Ratner that precludes any competition for however many decades it takes his company to complete Atlantic Yards? Are they saying that the public can’t even give project work to competing developers if Ratner dawdles for decades, goes bankrupt or reneges on what was once promised for delivery?
We have always advocated that development on the scale of Atlantic Yards should be done the way that other large developments are and should be done, using the same model as Battery Park City and Queens West: The project should be bid out, as ready, in multiple parcels to developers who actually commit themselves to specified results in the near term. If our advice were being followed some development in the area might be complete by now. More important, however, nobody would be arguing that whatever development wasn’t already underway couldn’t be bid out to take advantage of the substantial savings the public could now be achieving.
The IFC Media Project recently broadcast segment, Unreliable Sources, reported how, in a failure to serve the public interest, the major news story of the proposed Atlantic Yards megadevelopment has gone only “half-told” by New York’s three major dailies because of “government collusion with the developer and the developer's business ties.” The developer, (Forest City Ratner) business ties are to the New York Times. We were amused to see that the segment about the lack of critical coverage was recommended viewing on the Times TV page (see image above).
Opportune Time: Our Letter to The New York Times New Public Editor
This therefore seemed like an opportune time for us to continue with our series of letters about Atlantic Yards written to politicians and people of influence. In this post we publish the May 10, 2007 letter we wrote to the Times Public Editor, Clark Hoyt. We arranged for that letter to be on his desk the day he started his job as the Times new public editor. (Our earlier letters in this series to then Governor Spitzer and Mayor Bloomberg are available, respectively, at: Friday, August 22, 2008, Dear Eliot, . . . . . Please be a true reformer and Tuesday, August 19, 2008, Dear Mr. Bloomberg, . . . . . the Harm and the Foul.)
Times Created the Public Editor in 2003 as Ombudsman
The Times created the post of “public editor” in October 2003, after an internal review triggered by the Jayson Blair scandal. The public editor serves as an ombudsman and “readers’ representative” to investigate reader complaints and to sniff out and bring biased coverage to light. (See: Critical Acclaim, On the Media, April 29, 2005 and The Times Chooses Veteran of Magazines and Publishing as Its First Public Editor, by Jacques Steinberg, October 27, 2003)
The Brooklyn Museum Protest: Another Letter
Speaking of letters, we were pleased to see that the April 3, 2008 demonstration at the Brooklyn Museum protesting its highly inappropriate “honoring” of Bruce Ratner formed an important backdrop for part of the IFC piece. (For more on this see: Friday, April 04, 2008, "Shame!" Crowd outside museum shouts "Ratner's bad for Brooklyn") We note that you can find a letter on line from concerned members of the community that explains just how inappropriate it was for the Brooklyn Museum to honor Ratner and why that demonstration was held. We were, of course, a part of it. We are pleased that the IFC documentary served as a reminder to keep the question of the museum’s conduct in the public consciousness. The museum has yet to issue a suitable apology. The anniversary of the demonstration is coming up, so who knows, maybe a commemorating anniversary demonstration would be in order.
We Wrote The Times About. . .
Our letter below to the Times’ Mr. Hoyt references a number of reasons why the Atlantic Yards story should be better covered by the Times, starting with the issue of density and proceeding to questions of inappropriate government official conduct. For more on latter read the other letters in this series or follow the links in the letter below. (There is so much to say on subject of inappropriate government official conduct, these are just starter links.)
For more of what we have written on the subject of density and scale we recommend: Weighing Scale (Friday, September 26, 2008) and Jane Jacobs Atlantic Yards Report Card #4: Appropriate Density? NO (Saturday, November 29, 2008). We should also note that we separately approached the Times about addressing whether much of New York may be becoming too dense. The Times did not run the exact op-ed style piece we suggested but (coincidentally?) they subsequently ran a story consistent with our suggestion about whether increased density is going to overburden Bryant Park. It was a valuable article but its tone was dangerously close to one people may dismiss as “fluff.” Our complete story about what we sent the Times is at: Is NYC Becoming Too Dense? Who’s to Say? (Thursday, December 11, 2008).
. . . And You Can Too (After Recommended Viewing?)
Please consider writing your own letters to the Times and feel free to crib as much as you like from anything we have written. You might first want to watch the IFC Media Project’s Unreliable Sources segment. It is available on YouTube, see the No Land Grab link. Remember, the Times TV page said it is recommended viewing!
Our letter to the Times
* * * *
May 10, 2007 Mr. Clark Hoyt Public Editor New York Times 229 West 43rd Street New York, New York 10036
Re: Is the 1200 Pound Gorilla the Elephant in the News Room?
Dear Mr. Hoyt:
Welcome to New York. If you haven’t already done so, I suggest that you put on your list of new-to-the-city things-to-do, taking a visit to Battery Park City. Have a meal or drinks and take in the harbor at one of the waterside restaurants. Then I suggest that you take a tour which you combine with the following homework. Wander through the streets of Battery Park City and look up at the buildings.- - Ask yourself this question: Is Battery Park City too dense, not dense enough or just about right?
I think the answer is that the density is just about right, though the answer that suggests itself as you experience the streets might change with the development’s final build-out, just as it has shifted somewhat over the years of its construction since I graduated from urban planning school. If the experience is that the density of the development is “just about right” this is in no small degree a matter of Battery Park City’s excellent design, that it sits on the water, and that it has fabulously conceived open spaces, some of them sweeping and all of them superbly thought through. The development even has rooftop heliostats to redirect sunlight to shadowed plazas!
Now ask the question, if this is the right density for such a project under these excellent conditions, then what about the phenomenally greater density proposed for the Atlantic Yards project? Not only is Atlantic Yards proposed to be the most dense area of the United States, but it is poorly designed. Further, as a lawyer who has only just left government service, I feel ashamed and associationally tarred by the disregard for proper process and fundamental fairness that is bringing it about.
I invite you to visit the web site “Atlantic Yards Report” and to watch Isabel Hill’s 2007 documentary “Brooklyn Matters.” Even if you were to quibble in any way about details in either one, you cannot disagree that each is an example of excellent journalism.
Central to the unfolding story to be told is the theme of politicians acting out of character with their promises and advertised personas and how it may all come home to roost.
Some day a great book will likely be written about what happened in the center Brooklyn, particularly if anything like the monstrosity proposed ultimately materializes and affects generations. The New York Times will be mentioned but, as things stands now, every last footnote mentioning the Times will be about how the Times did not adequately cover this story. No doubt analogies will be offered with regard to the Time’s other recent failures of coverage while mention will have to be made of the possible influence of the business relationship between the Times and Atlantic Yards’ oddly selected developer.
There is still time to start covering a major story.- Obviously, there is also an obligation to the public to do so.
Sincerely,
Michael D. D. White
* * * *
A Parting Mention: Great Public Expense
Signing off, we will note that the IFC documentary piece covered the fact that Atlantic Yards will be costing the public a huge amount in public subsidy, between $2 and $3 billion. We didn’t write about this in our letter to the public editor, but it is something we worked on with New York Post reporter Rich Calder when he wrote Your 'Net' Loss, $2B in Taxes to Ratner (April 14, 2008). The estimated minimum figures that can be calculated with reasonable definiteness come to a total of $2.1 billion. The actual total will probably be higher still, perhaps much closer to $3 billion. (Though it can be pointed out that the $2.1 minimum subsidy number could be better established, any substantial issue with the number is probably taken mainly by those calculating the numbers inconsistently intending to disingenuously minimize depicted costs: Stadium Finance: Mayor, Professing to Know Numbers, Should Know He Can’t Have It Both Ways (Unless He’s Keeping Two Sets of Books, Monday, December 15, 2008.))
Rich Calder, interviewed in the IFC piece, complained about a lack of access to information. I think that Mr. Calder was referring in part to the fact that the public agencies responsible for Atlantic Yards are not supplying the public with information to facilitate knowledge of what the actual costs likely are. The developer, Forest City Ratner, fuzzes up the numbers to the best of its ability and the public agencies are more or less complicit. Norman Oder of Atlantic Yards Report advocates that when a news story and numbers aren’t handed to you, reporters need to go out and get them: The IFC Media Project scoop: former Daily News reporter says she was pulled off AY beat (and source blames Ratner), Tuesday, December 09, 2008.
A Matter of Class; Chop Shops vs. Stadium Builders
There is also the possibility that there is a class thing going on. Bloomberg may be able to see the value of real estate and the city only the way his Wall Street and big developer friends might see it. Perhaps that is why he imagines this busy thriving but lower-class area to be one of “deserted warehouses" where the only activity is illegal.
As stated, Willets Point is right next to the Citifield stadium replacement for Shea Stadium. The Mayor and his Wall Street and developer friends have been active with respect to building and financing stadiums and sports arenas like the new Yankee Stadium and the Nets arena. It is worth remembering that with all the shenanigans engaged in with respect to the development and financing of those sports venues, it is far from clear that the Mayor and his friends have stayed on the legal side of the line. (See: Saturday, November 8, 2008, Does Questionable Assertion of Attorney-client Privilege Point to Yankee Stadium Bond Taxability?)
While an illegal chop shop involves an illegal redistribution of wealth, the sport venue financings involve a far more massive redistribution of wealth from the average tax-paying citizen to the mayor’s wealthy associates (More Money for the Very Rich: An Unsporting Pursuit? March 17, 2008). The picking of the public’s pocket and massive redistribution of wealth that sports venue (stadium and arena) financings represent may technically manage to fall on the proper side of “legal” but that doesn’t make them more acceptable. To the extent that the financing is or might be legal at all it is a problem with the law and tax code loopholes.
Big-Developer Style of Redevelopment
The form that the Bloomberg Administration’s redevelopment of Willets Point is proposed to take involves replacing what is there with a big-developer style of redevelopment. If it succeeds as described with its “high quality” hotel and convention center, it is apparently supposed to surpass rather than resemble the regional community into which it would be implanted. Is it realistic? Whether realistic or not, there has been criticism that the vision pursued will be developer-originated and -driven rather than coming from the community.
One such critic is Brad Lander, executive director of the Pratt Institute Center for Community and Environmental Development, who said the city should have led "a public process, informed by data" before asking developers to submit detailed proposals.
Eight finalist developers submitted plans for Willets Point in March of 2006. (See: The Iron Triangle Begins to Melt, by Matthew Schuerman, March 3, 2006.) The finalist developers at that time were (reciting below with reporter Mr. Schuerman’s characterizations included):
1. Macerich (operates Queens Center mall) with AvalonBay 2. Westfield (former owner of the World Trade Center mall) 3. Vornado Realty Trust (big dog on the porch) 4. TDC Development & Construction (Flushing Commons) 5. Forest City Ratner (of Atlantic Yards fame) 6. Related (another big dog) 7. Partnership of General Growth (new South Street Seaport owners), Rosenheim Associates , LCOR and Massachusetts-based Sage Hotel 8. Muss Development (Flushing Town Center)
We should note that the ordering on this list, which is not alphabetical, is out of an EDC press release. We can’t tell you why the order is what it is, why, for instance, Muss Development is listed last. Reportedly, Vornado did not submit a follow-up bid (Willets Point Plan Challenges Developers, by David Lombino, May 25, 2006).
Only One Developer for an Immense Project? Contrast Battery Park City Model
The City Economic Development Corporation site timeline calendar for the project cryptically states: “Spring 2009: Select developer.”
Why does the site say select developer referring to “developer” in the singular? If Willets Point is 60-62 acres, it is two-thirds the size of Battery Park City which is 92 acres and 9,000 residential units versus the 5,500 units proposed here. Battery Park City was developed by many, many developers. Why would the city award over 60 acres of development to a single company? It evinces an extreme faith in a big development model. It doesn’t make sense. It makes it much more likely that design will be a fluidly changing event driven by a developer rather than being dictated by the public. The majority of decisions will probably be made after the developer has been given a monopoly on the site and the public has lost its negotiating power to control events.
In contrast, the Battery Park City’s model of bidding separate parcels out to the development community at large ensures that the public will get maximum value for the subsidy contributions the public will be making. With a single developer the public will lose the ability to leverage its investment for maximum value when the parcel is developed. The public is also likely to lose control over the schedule of development. More likely that schedule will become what is convenient for the developer which is an undesirable form of additional subsidy in itself. There are already signs that schedule information that has been promulgated is deceptively fictive and the schedule is actually fluid. More on this below.
Municipal Art Society Hearing Testimony on One Developer
The Municipal Art Society shares many concerns with us respecting the Willets Point Development (including using only one developer) which they analyzed at length. Some extracts from their August 13, 2008 comments on the Draft Environmental Impact Statement are as follows:
. . . with respect to the EDC’s proposed ownership model, given the current economic climate doesn’t structuring the plan around a single developer risk long delays at the cost of promised public benefits?
* * * * The Willets Point Development and Urban Renewal plans have been ill conceived. o The City should invest in infrastructure and site preparation o The City should incorporate a multiple-developer model with clear public oversight
* * * *
The Willets Point development plan, which relies on a single developer for site preparation as well as build-out, is a redevelopment model that has not proven to be successful, as demonstrated by the Atlantic Yards and Hudson Yards projects. By eschewing the public sector’s responsibility to prepare the site and provide the public infrastructure necessary for redevelopment, the City is running the risk that the development at Willets Point, as at Atlantic Yards, will stall indefinitely. At the same time, if the City acquires control over the entire site – if necessary through the use of eminent domain – local property owners will have relinquished their stake in the area. This creates the possibility that the site will remain vacant and/or underutilized for years to come.
* * * * The recent experience at Atlantic Yards serves as a cautionary note to the strategy of developer constructed infrastructure, as their decision making is tied more to capital market fluctuations, compared to the public sector.
If One Developer- Do We suspect. . .
The fact that the city is putting all its development eggs in one basket is an indication that the city probably has an idea of who the developer will be even if it has not yet officially `selected’ the developer. Wouldn’t even the largest developers have to be gearing up already if there were going to take on a project of such scale on their own? The EDC timeline says that site acquisition and relocation is supposed to happen in Spring/Summer 2009 with site preparation, remediation, and construction beginning (right after?) in 2010. Should it be suspected that channels of communication are already open and that the city is hearing information about what the developer thinks will work for them?
Reckoning Acreage: Various Reported Figures
With so much hanging in the balance, it would make sense if much better information about what was going on was publicly available. We’ve noted the wide disparity in the calculation of the number of jobs that will be lost. If you want to calculate how many jobs per acre will be lost the task is even harder because there are different figures for how many acres comprise Willets Point. If you roam around the media, the acreage for the Iron Triangle is variously reported as 55, 60, 61, 62, 64 and 75 acres. Normally the figure is given at around 62 acres, which probably represents a rounding up from a 61.5 acre figure. We suspect that this may somewhat overstate the acreage associated with the Willets Point businesses. There are political advantages and disadvantages to both overstating and understating the business acreage. Stating the acreage low minimizes the eminent domain taking but increases the job/business per acre ratio. On the other hand, stating a high acreage figure could make the scrap metal businesses seem more `dog in the manger’ and as if they are standing in the way of valuable development. It also makes the upzoning seem less significant.
The city asserts surprisingly in one of its Downtown Flushing Development Framework documents that the jobs per acre for the M3-1 zoned Willets Point are low:
Willets Point is zoned M3-1 for heavy manufacturing, a land use designation that is in relatively short supply in the city. . . .Currently, however, the businesses on Willets Point . . . are significantly less productive than those in other M3-1 zones in New York City in terms of employment and value added. For instance, the City estimates that the total jobs per acre on Willets Point is between one-half and one-fifth of the figures for other M3-1 zones.
Obviously, the job ratio, unstated by the document, would depend on the figures assumed for the number of jobs and the for acreage. It is possible to calculate a higher ratio but 1,800 jobs divided by 60 acres would be 30 jobs per acre. A Pratt Study says that in Long Island City in 2000 “overall manufacturing job density is 10.3 jobs per acre.” In EIS documents for the rezoning of the much more prime Greenpoint Williamsburg real estate characterizes contrasting jobs per acre figures: “40.9 jobs per acre versus 6 jobs per acre in the areas slated for residential use.” Nearby to Willets Point, the Bloomberg administration planned to develop the 26 acre site of the former site of Flushing Airport to create 400 permanent jobs (15.4 jobs per acre).
It seems that the variously reported acreage figures for Willets Point can be reconciled this way. Apparently it is possible to calculate that the Willets Point area bounded in by the highways that will be turned over to private developers is a total of about 75 acres. (That’s according to an EDC press release.) Of this, about 45 acres are privately owned, but those acres are mixed in with streets and acreage owned by the MTA. The MTA has about 13.5 acres that it uses for a bus parking and storage. 16 acres are Streets. (The MTA will continue to use land in the area which the Municipal Art Society suggests may pose a concern for the workability of the redevelopment’s urban design.)
Open Space and Parkland?
Battery Park City is about 40% parkland with 36 of its 92 acres being devoted to park space. By comparison, 8 acres of open space are being talked about for the Willets Point development. No matter how it’s calculated that will be a much lesser percentage. While the Willets Point project is nearly surrounded water (Battery park City is actually on the Hudson), the experience on the edges of the project will be of the surrounding highways that intervene. The project is near the large Flushing Meadow Corona Park but it will be a long unpleasant walk past parking lots, a stadium and a train yard to get there.
How Long Will it Take? It Wouldn’t Be 10 Years like They Said Because a Deal for 15 Years . . .
Very recently, contemporaneously with the City Council approval it was reported that “The redevelopment of Willets Point, . . .is expected to be completed in about 10 years.” (See: Council Approves Queens Redevelopment Plans, by Fernanda Santos, November 13, 2008.) It is not clear whether that reported period includes or excludes the time that would precede EDC’s projected 2010 construction start date but perhaps the city conveniently neglected to inform the Times reporter that the 10-year construction period was out-of-date information. In order to negotiate deals with enough Willets Point landowners so as to persuade the City Council to vote for the plan, the city reportedly made deals which entail allowing land owners to remain in place up to 15 years before eminent domain would be used against them. The following is reported in Iron Triangle Tracker about an accord “struck in the morning before the vote”:
The proverbial ax may have fallen on most of Willets Point yesterday, but the three largest businesses in the industrial community were issued a stay of execution — at least for the foreseeable future.
In the 11th hour of negotiations ahead of yesterday’s City Council vote, the city inked a deal that will allow Tully Construction, House of Spices and Fodera Foods to remain at Willets Point for up to 15 years.
City’s Divide-and-Conquer Deal; Three Big Owners Get Upzoning Value
The deal was a divide-and-conquer strategy by the city. It allows three major owners not only to remain in place for a substantial period of time with more control over planning their departure. It also allows them to sell their land for a much higher price. The plan allows these owners, unlike their neighbors, to benefit from the coming upzoning of the land (also per the above article):
Should a situation arise where Tully, Fodera or House of Spices opt not to sell their land, the city would be able to pursue eminent domain after 15 years, though it remains confident this will not be necessary, sources with knowledge of the negotiations said.
The EDC said the businesses will be able to sell their land directly to the developer at a much higher price than they would through negotiations being conducted by the city — chiefly because the rezoning the City Council passed boosts the perceived value of the land to a third party.
A Two-Phase Project and an Admittedly Longer Time Frame
The deal apparently envisions the project proceeding in at least two phases, with an eastern phase where construction would perhaps not begin until at least 15 years out. So much for completion of the project within 10 years!
The EDC said that because the properties all reside on the easternmost portion of the 62-acre site slated for redevelopment, the city will be able to conduct a multi-million dollar environmental remediation and implement much of the infrastructure improvements — such as a sewer system — needed to sustain the planned development.
Negotiating Postures; Transparency Suffers When Information Valuable to Public is Withheld
The process for disclosure of what the public is getting and when the public is getting it is not transparent. As an indication of this the Iron Triangle Tracker article above points out that EDC had previously contended the project could not be phased, a postion apparently taken publicly for the purpose of negotiating. For whatever reason, true and correct information which would have been valuable to the public process was withheld and/or obfuscated. This is keenly relevant since eminent domain is being invoked in the name of the public. The Iron Triangle Tracker:
The agreement represents a step back for the city from its initial assertion that the 62-acre swath of land earmarked for development would need to be cleared and remediated as a whole.
The mammoth Willets Point redevelopment plan could be divided into two stages under an alternative approach being considered by city officials.
But a key backer of the city's Willets Point vision, Queens Borough President Helen Marshall, denounced the piecemeal option as "crazy." Marshall said she believes the option is aimed at averting the controversial use of eminent domain.
* * * City Economic Development Corp. officials discussed the option while presenting the Willets Point plan to the City Planning Commission on April 21, kicking off the public review process.
Under the alternative, the heavily polluted 62-acre site would be divided into two segments.
The western portion would be developed first, with land acquisition beginning in 2009, followed by site cleanup and then construction. Once the western portion is finished sometime in 2013, the eastern portion would proceed down the same path, with construction expected to conclude in 2017.
Information About Divided Project Helps to Calculate How Long: Certainly Not 10 Years, the Project Now Looks like it Could Take Over 30
The 15-year holding period negotiated with the three eastern owners would obviously take the commencement of the eastern phase out to 2023, not 2013 as the above seems to suggest (without actually committing to it). Taking this discrepancy as an indicator may point the following: It may take 15 years rather than the projected 3 years (after ESDC’s 2010 web site commencement date) to construct the western phase of the project. The eastern phase is officially projected to take an additional 5 years; if those 5 years were proportionately extended then perhaps the eastern phase of the development should be projected take more than an additional 15 years. That would mean that it is expected that the entire development could take in excess of 30 years. This substantially longer time frame is probably much more consistent with what developers of megadevelopments generally reckon rather than the shorter time frame previously promulgated.
The option of using multiple developers which is being forsworn here would have assured faster overall construction. Battery Park City, 92 acres and 9,000 units has used multiple developers and is only just now nearing completion. It was begun, on a vacant site 28 years ago in 1980.
While the above indicates that we could be dealing with a buildout that could take in itself take over 30 years, the pertinent period could be longer still if there is litigation. Delaying litigation could occur at the outset. With the 15-year hold-off in bringing eminent domain with respect to the eastern parcels a second round of litigation might occur then. The second round of litigation could be the more interesting if in the next generation we see legislatively or judicially implemented eminent domain reform.
A Slower Constructed Two-Phase Project; a Few Problems/Benefits?
If there is a substantial period of time when the project is only half constructed, then the people living in the development will experience the problems experienced on Roosevelt Island when it was a community with too few units (2,141) for there to be good services supporting them.
Here are the other perceived problems discussed in the continuation of the Daily News article above:
But Marshall said it is impractical to develop the site piecemeal, particularly because it would produce the awkward juxtaposition of families living alongside contaminated land cluttered with junkyards and auto-body shops.
"I don't want to subject families to that," she said.
EDC officials did not respond to multiple requests for comment.
But the benefits of a piecemeal approach, as stated in the draft plans, are that it would "allow the city additional time to find suitable relocation sites" and also "spread the cost of property acquisition and infrastructure improvements over time."
Note that the benefits described above do not mention using the divide-and-conquer approach and allowing upzoning benefit value to be pocketed by three eastern owners.
Marshall, however, said she believes the option is aimed at reducing the likelihood that the project - opposed in its current form by 29 City Council members - will require controversial eminent domain land grabs.
"I don't think it's a secret. What they're trying to do is to avoid the anti-eminent domain spirit that is going around the City Council," Marshall said.
Marshall also feared the conference center - much needed by the Queens Chamber of Commerce - would be imperiled under the piecemeal approach.
Compared to the single-phase development model, the piecemeal approach "would not provide the same flexibility in siting" the conference center that the draft plans note, the borough president contended.
The “Flexible” Long-term Project; Where the Public Gets Shortchanged
Reference to “flexibility” in the last paragraph points to the fact that plans for the development are fluid. But it doesn’t make sense to be negotiating with a developer about fluidly changing plans after you have granted a developer a monopoly on 75 acres of development opportunity. Once again we point out that this is the opposite of the very effective Battery Park City exemplar of bidding out building sites over time to multiple developers after the public has determined what it wants. Everyone knows that with respect to building your own home you don’t bid out constructions before you know what you want and expect to change it all through change orders later on.
The idea of completing the project maybe 20 to 30 or 35 years out rather than 10 is quite consistent with the idea that the city envisions accommodating a single developer by letting them proceed with this project entirely on their own time frame. It is a very accommodating posture, essentially like tying a feedbag on a horse. The developer gets to munch at their own pace over an extended period of years. Again, this should be considered a subsidy. The fact that the 15-year deal was recently negotiated probably reflects a realistic recognition that the project is likely to proceed slowly given the current state of the economy.
The current poor economy is likely to mean that the single developer’s bid in 2009 will be a low one. That is especially unfortunate because by not dividing the site up and bidding it out as parcels over time the city is sacrificing its ability capture increasing values in future bids as the area develops. The larger a site and the more protracted its development, the more critical the application of this principle. This criticism has been made of developing the much smaller 26.2 Hudson Yards site and is also applicable to the 22-acre site of the proposed Atlantic Yards.
The more slowly the project proceeds, the more it is likely to change. The more it changes after a developer has been awarded a monopoly the more likely it is that the public will be shortchanged. Figuring out what the redevelopment plan is and whether it makes sense is not that easy from the information that has been made publicly available. It is possible though that the most definite part of the Bloomberg administration’s development plan is the desire to use eminent domain.
How Much Might the Project Change? Some Thoughts on the Convention Center
What sort of changes might occur at Willets Point? The last paragraph of the above quoted article (see the last indent) referred to possibilities with respect to siting the conference center. There has been discussion about expanding the size of the convention center to make it a replacement for the Javits Center. (See: Javits Expansion May Decamp to Queens, By Peter Kiefer, February 25, 2008.)
That may not happen, but even though the project may have changed a great deal in terms of schedule, City Councilman John Liu was previously complaining about the lack of development plan specifics back when this was discussed.
Another critic of the plan has been Councilman John Liu. Mr. Liu is in favor of developing Willets Point but has been critical of how the EDC has communicated the details.
"What was a plan that should have been flushed out more and more as time went on actually has become more of a skeleton," he said.
But Mr. Liu says that with 61 available acres, expanding the proposed size of the convention center would not be a problem. "I think that if the plan is to build a convention center at Willets Points there will be overwhelming if not universal enthusiasm," he said.
(Note, earlier and more recent rendering show a conference center in different locations. The later renderings show the conference center backed against the elevated highway to the northeast, which is probably preferable to putting it next to the creek and wetlands.)
NOTICING NEW YORK & NATIONAL NOTICE are both independent entities managed by Michael D. D. White of Hop-Skip Enterprises. Michael D. D. White is an attorney, urban planner and former government public finance and development official. *** Noticing New York covers New York development and associated politics. National Notice covers national policy and economic issues *** Contact: MichaelDDWhite(at)gmail.com
(Above, - click to enlarge- Battery Park City, viewed from the north on the Hudson and an image from the Municipal Art Society's "Atlantic Lots" images of what Brooklyn faces over the next several decades as Forest City Ratner slowly proceeds with his mega-monopoly. We updated the image with the Prokhorov/Ratner basketball arena. Original aerial photography of the yards by Jonathan Barkey.) (Above, in the archaic and discredited superblock tradition, the two largest blocks above are comprised of what were previously five individual blocks. Even accommodating the insertion of the massive arena into the brownstone neighborhood there should still be at least four individual blocks and there is an attractive opportunity for there to be more than five blocks as suggested in the community's proposed UNITY plan which would probably be the case if this were fit into the grid of Battery park City.)
(Above, a generic rendering showing scale from the Municipal Art Society's Atlantic Lots. Original aerial photograph by Jonathan Barkey.)
• Battery Park City is about 40% parkland with 36 of its 92 acres devoted to park space. Atlantic Yards has no true comparable public park areas and some of the green roof area that was once considered to be part of its “park” or “green” space has been eliminated form the designs.
(Above, the Prokhorov/Ratner basketball arena- aka "Barclays Arena" the first and only part of Ratner's mega-monopoly likely to be built in the near term which will be a very expensive net loss for the public.)
